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ABC & WALL STREET: 
 
THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE TELEVISION AUDIENCE, 
 
FROM BROADCAST TO STREAMING 
 
PETER ARNE JOHNSON 
ABSTRACT 
In the late 20th century, the global economy experienced a radical shift due to 
widespread deregulation and, subsequently, rapid financialization. Examining archival and 
contemporary trade magazines and corporate reports, this project considers the 
interconnections between television audience constructions/ratings and financial 
institutions amid these structural changes. This thesis starts by charting the pre-history of 
media financialization and financial stakeholders’ early influence over the radio industry 
and its antecedent industries (i.e., the telegraph and telephone) between 1800 and 1943. 
After charting a historical overview of media industries’ relationships to Wall Street, the 
second chapter details the financialization of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) 
between 1943 and 1970 and considers the correlation between Nielsen ratings and stock 
prices. In the third chapter, these theories are brought into the 21st century, examining how 
media companies like Disney “pitch” their audiences to Wall Street and how financial 
incentives have led streaming platforms to engage in performative social justice in order to 
cater to upscale white audiences.  
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Although the quantity and diversity of television programs have increased since 
the multi-channel transition in the 1980s and 1990s, seemingly providing more users with 
niche targeted content, the market power of a few consolidated corporations has 
nonetheless compounded. According to Ben Bagdikian (2000), approximately 50 
corporations dominated the media industries in 1983. However, by 1987, media 
dominance was in the hands of 29 companies, and then by 1999, only ten conglomerates 
dominated most industry activity (Bagdikian 2000, xx–xxi). In 2021, in light of recent 
market capitalization figures, six corporations—AT&T, Disney, Comcast, Verizon, 
Netflix, and Charter Communications—now control the majority of the media industries 
through their holdings in streaming, distribution/infrastructure, and content ownership 
(Macrotrends, n.d.). Notably absent are CBSViacom, Sony Pictures, and Fox, all of 
which have had volatile or diminishing market power within the past two decades.1 This 
list also excludes Apple, Amazon, Google, and other tech companies, all of which could 
be perceived as media corporations and are increasingly encroaching on the cultural 
industries by vertically integrating into content production; however, unlike AT&T, 
Comcast, Verizon, and Charter, they do not control broadband or cable delivery. 
A multiplicity of causes—deregulation, globalization, and digitization—have 
contributed to this consolidation and lack of competition within media industries. 
Another -ation has accelerated these trends but remains largely unaddressed within 
 
1 Additionally, Fox’s dominance in media industries was substantially diminished after it sold 21st 




political economy and media studies scholarship: financializ-ation. Indeed, the increasing 
power and reach of the financial sector, including that of banks, mutual funds, private 
equity firms, and other financial institutions, have undergirded market concentration and 
monopolistic business practices over the past century. While financialization is 
sometimes obliquely referenced, and Wall Street players are occasionally included in 
media studies analyses, there is a paucity of literature on the historical relationship 
between communication systems and finance. While media concentration and anti-
competitive markets are consistent preoccupations in critical political economy (Wasko 
2005, 34), when one looks beneath market concentration at the actual equity ownership in 
media corporations (i.e., those who hold stock ownership in media conglomerates), 
market concentration is even more anti-competitive than previously postulated. One need 
only study the investment portfolios of the two largest mutual funds, Vanguard and 
BlackRock, to see that they maintain a stranglehold over the media industries and 
beyond. 
The increasing role of financial institutions in media ownership warrants a 
reexamination of political economic and media industries literature and a re-charting of 
the changes and continuities in the relationship between finance and media. In this thesis, 
I leverage the corporate history of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to 
develop a longitudinal case study of such financialization, from the company’s origins as 
NBC Blue through its integration into Disney and Hulu. I ask how the changing financial 
ownership underlying ABC has affected industry concentration, ABC’s target audiences, 




decisions and corporate strategies. Integrating scholarship from media industries studies, 
political economy, media economics, and business management studies, the aim of this 
research project is to draw attention to the normative dimensions of media ownership and 
television financing—without promoting outright structural determinism or ignoring 
audiences, creative agency, and industry practices.2 In this thesis, I ultimately conclude 
that financialization has not only engendered a consolidation of media industries but also 
increasingly led conglomerates to cater their programming decisions to Wall Street 
stakeholders and well-off, white audiences. 
Theory & Framework 
Critical Political Economy: From the Culture Industry to Cultural Industries 
As media studies is in and of itself an eclectic and multidisciplinary field, this 
thesis draws from multiple disciplines, including critical political economy, cultural 
studies, media economics, and media industry studies (which is also a multidisciplinary 
subfield), in order to fully address the historical, industrial, and cultural implications of 
financialization on television. Having said that, critical political economy of media 
provides the foundational frameworks, methods, and approaches necessary to 
contextualize how finance has enabled market concentration and programming. As such, 
it is first necessary to outline the various strands of political economy, including those 
that I will draw from in the later chapters of this thesis.  
 
2 In other words, the findings in this project suggest that media financing is a deeply cultural and 
social phenomenon that certainly limits the autonomy and choice of laborers and consumers, in certain 





Antecedents to political economy include Marxist theories and the work of the 
Frankfurt School, particularly Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer ([1947] 1972). 
Their “culture industry” thesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment posited that mass cultural 
production, whether that of film, publishing, or broadcasting, adhered to the same logics 
as manufacturing production and effectively turned audiences into passive consumers of 
manufacturing-age products. They maintained that the masses continually turn to cultural 
institutions for psychological fulfillment, and this dynamic precluded the possibility that 
the working class could overthrow the elites, as Marx had advocated. While they 
certainly overstate the effectiveness of elitist ideology and remain pessimistic regarding 
any positive class change, Adorno and Horkheimer’s polemical work is often the straw 
man for cultural theorists who conflate political economy with the Frankfurt School. 
Nonetheless, critical political economy consists of several approaches that diverge and 
overlap, many of which have moved beyond the economic and ideological determinism 
of the Frankfurt School to critically consider agency, contestation, and struggle within 
cultural production, distribution, and consumption.  
Dwayne Winseck (2011), for example, breaks down the field into four significant 
approaches. The least critical approach, conservative and liberal neoclassical economics, 
argues that state intervention and regulation should be minimized to optimize markets, 
maximize profitability, and increase employment (16–17). These economists often 
celebrate the current neoliberal state of contemporary media ecosystems. Second, 
Winseck identifies radical media political economy as a strand that objects to the social 




this category, Winseck further identifies two subapproaches: the digital capitalism school 
and the monopoly capital school (21–22). According to Winseck, the monopoly 
capitalism school, with proponents like Robert McChesney, naively focus too much on 
the very top of the pyramid of power and ignore the complexities at other levels of media 
production, distribution, and consumption. The digital capitalism schools, with 
proponents like Dan Schiller and Vincent Mosco, focus on the role of information 
technologies in further empowering capitalist systems and commodification. Third, 
Schumpeterian institutional political economy argues that “creative destruction” through 
technological innovation is the central attribute of capitalism and, at the same time, 
acknowledges that agency and social forces play a role in determining market outcomes 
(25). Finally, Winseck identifies the cultural industries school, which maintains that 
media industries should not be studied as one uniform force but as a complex and 
multifaceted system of people and motivations (29). Some scholars from the cultural 
industries school, notably Nicholas Garnham and David Hesmondhalgh, argue that media 
industries have specific attributes that are distinct from other industries, and as such, 
require their own approach. Although not strictly adhering to one specific approach, this 
thesis is most sympathetic to the cultural industries theory and the theoretical 
underpinning of David Hesmondhalgh (2013), who maintains that cultural products are 
hardly the result of elitist and/or capitalist ideologies but are instead “complex, 
ambivalent and contested,” thus resulting in contradictory rhetoric from the same 
industry, organization, or even individual (46). 




overview of the history of political economy. Similar to Winseck, Wasko distinguishes 
neoliberal approaches to political economy from radical/critical/Marxian political 
economy. She calls the former a “corporatist” approach that uses neoclassical economics 
to expand “individual freedom” (26). Wasko believes that radical political economy most 
clearly represents the political economy of communication in its contemporary form. 
Building upon the work of Vincent Mosco (1996) and seemingly Peter Golding and 
Graham Murdock (1991), Wasko details the four defining attributes of the political 
economy of communication: (1) a consideration of social change over time and the 
history of capitalism, (2) a holistic approach that considers not just commodities and 
institutions but also social relations and hegemony, (3) an emphasis on moral philosophy 
that considers morality and policy just as much as economics, and (4) praxis (26–27). 
Similar to Winseck, Wasko provides several ways that political economists can 
methodologically approach media and information industries. The approach that Wasko 
identifies that is most central to the aim of this thesis is “corporate studies,” which 
investigates the “ownership and control of specific media organizations” (36). 
Specifically, it assesses “the precise mechanisms” of ownership and control and the 
corresponding “trends of commodification, integration and diversification” that affect 
“creativity, diversity, equity, access and democratic ideals” (36). The aim of this project 
also rests on another similar assumption, which is best summarized by Jonathan Hardy 
(2014): political economy considers how the “different ways of organising and financing 
communications have implications for the range and nature of media content, and the 




taxonomies, critical political economy represents a multiplicity of approaches and 
characteristics, but it nonetheless constitutes a critical, rather than celebratory, tradition 
that emphasizes action and praxis, rather than echo chamber cynicism. Therefore, this 
thesis concludes with specific prescriptions that address some contemporary ownership 
issues. 
Cultural Studies: Toward Integration 
Despite political economy’s eclectic and broad history, media and cultural studies 
have at times pigeonholed the field as one-dimensional and ignorant of consumption and 
agency. However, the two fields are more integrated than often acknowledged. The work 
of the British Cultural Studies tradition in the 1960s and 1970s (Raymond Williams; John 
Fiske; Stuart Hall; Richard Hoggart) reveals that political economy and cultural studies 
have not always been mutually exclusive in academic spheres. While the British Cultural 
Studies school often focused on consumption and audience autonomy, rather than just 
economics or industry, they nonetheless drew from Marxist traditions to examine 
democracy, industry, class, and popular culture. Therefore, it is unavoidable that cultural 
studies “came out of a set of political economic assumptions” (Garnham 1997, 57). 
However, since the time of British Culture Studies’ integration of class and cultural 
analysis, cultural studies began its “head­long rush towards the pleasures and differences 
of postmodernism” (Garnham 1997, 56). Although there have been many exchanges 
between political economy and both cultural studies (Garnham 1995; Grossberg 1995) 
and media industry studies (Havens, Lotz, and Tinic 2009; Wasko and Meehan 2013) that 




important work of building a critical body of scholarship that can help us more fully 
understand media texts, industries, and audiences. Many cultural scholars, such as Robert 
Babe (2009), have sought to move past the cultural studies/political economy divisions in 
academic circles. Indeed, these separations are often unproductive and redundant.  
Instead of necessarily cordoning off political economy as a distinct field of study 
or isolated framework, Douglas Kellner (1997) offers that political economy is just one of 
many ways to approach culture—in addition to textual analysis and audience studies. 
Kellner argues that “political economy alone does not hold the key to cultural studies” 
and that political economists should apply more formal and audience analyses to media 
text(s) (109). However, this thesis focuses on industry practices and policy and, therefore, 
is not as concerned with one particular program or its formal components, so textual 
analysis is not necessarily applicable to the research questions of this thesis. Further, 
audience studies are beyond the scope of this project; though, a more comprehensive 
study could integrate such approaches. Instead, this thesis is rooted in the notion that “the 
system of production [and distribution] often determines what sort of artifacts will be 
produced, what structural limits there will be as to what can and cannot be said and 
shown, and what sort of audience expectations and usage the text may generate” (Kellner 
1997, 105). My findings support the claim that economic and industrial structures set the 
terms of cultural production and meaning-making, but this does not preclude the 
possibility of contestation and agency. 
Media Industries Studies 




become more integrated and less distinct, much of the work that overlaps with the aims of 
this study derives from what is now deemed media industries studies, which first began to 
take shape in the late 2000s.3 Drawing from film and media studies, sociology, 
anthropology, journalism, communication, and economics, Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren 
(2009) first provided cogency to media industry studies with their collection Media 
Industries: History, Theory, and Method. Holt and Perren unite what were previously 
disparate fields and move past the cultural studies versus political economy debate to 
provide “integrated analyses of media texts, audiences, histories, and culture [that] could 
enable more productive scholarship” (2). Simultaneously, in a critical retort to political 
economy that represented a slightly narrower approach to media industry studies than that 
of Holt and Perren, Timothy Havens, Amanda Lotz, and Serra Tinic (2009) advocated for 
“midlevel fieldwork” and “grounded institutional case studies” to understand the 
relationship between broader economic goals/strategies and industry practices (247). 
They argue that power is not a fixed structure but a hegemonic discourse that seeks to 
turn corporate strategy “into seemingly irrefutable logics of how systems should operate” 
(247). While some of their conclusions overlook the critical work of scholars like Janet 
Wasko and Eileen Meehan, Havens, Lotz, and Tinic nonetheless offer a widely cited 
definition of the subfield. Ten years later, in “Media Industries: A Decade in Review,” 
Holt and Perren (2019) conclude that “there is a common theme connected to the tone of 
the industry scholarship produced in the last ten years: the prior optimism regarding the 
 
3 It is worth noting that there were scholars, such as Todd Gitlin (1983), who were doing the type of 
work that many would consider media industries studies long before the field more consciously 




possibilities of digital distribution and participatory culture has largely been replaced by a 
far more somber recognition of the harsh realities of the contemporary digital ecosystem” 
(38). Accordingly, recent media industry studies scholarship has centrally emphasized 
activism and intervention—long a key attribute of political economy.  
Another valuable strand of media industry studies that is relevant to the case 
studies presented in this thesis is the production cultures approach. John Thornton 
Caldwell (2008) turned his attention to the micro-practices of Hollywood’s “below-the-
line” staff and examined how these individuals self-theorized about their profession and 
negotiated their own agency. By drawing attention to the rituals and actual day-to-day 
activities of cultural intermediaries through ethnographic research, Caldwell’s work 
typifies contemporary media industry studies scholarship advocated for by Havens, Lotz, 
and Tinic (2009). The production studies approach also echoes David Hesmondhalgh’s 
theorization on industrial contestation and ambivalence. Derek Johnson, Derek Kompare, 
and Avi Santo (2014) apply Caldwell’s industrial self-theorization thesis and production 
cultures framework to media executives and managers to argue that these laborers 
represent a heterogeneous culture of shifting “discourses, dispositions, and tactics,” rather 
than “suits” who oppose creativity outright (2). 
Media Economics 
As suggested earlier, political economy has disparaged media economics for its 
lack of critical analysis. Janet Wasko (2005) concludes that “mainstream (neo-classical) 
economics seldom present serious critique of the capitalist media system” (41). While 




industries. Adopting an integrative approach in Lotz and Perren’s Media Industries, 
Phillip Napoli (2009) maintains that media studies would be well served to consider 
media economics, even in political and cultural contexts. Napoli also points out that 
media economics has increasingly been used for public policy and enforcement, 
particularly because media industries have distinct attributes that do not adhere to 
traditional economic assumptions. Therefore, if one of the aims of media industry studies 
is indeed activism (and that of political economy is praxis), scholars should consider 
media economic theories, including those that may seemingly be non-critical, to address 
power imbalances and state intervention. 
Although the underlying goal of many economists, whether Keynesian or 
neoliberal, may be to maximize productivity, profits, growth, employment, and other 
financial metrics, there are still some scholars within the field who take up critical or 
even Marxian approaches to the economy. These critical social scientific economists 
provide the frameworks and structural context necessary to understand how particular 
industries and financial institutions are harmful to culture and society. For example, the 
work of Marxist economists like Gerald Epstein (2005) and Gerard Dumenil and 
Dominique Levy (2005)—not to be confused with Marxist political economists—offer 
applied and quantitative scholarly work that contextualizes the implications of 
financialization on the power of labor, user agency, and diversity of choice. In another 
respect, this project will even reference the work of neoclassical economists like the 
“godfather” of media economics, Robert G. Picard, whose work offers vital context on 




industry studies nor political economy has fully considered. 
Financialization 
Although financial trends and stock market vicissitudes may appear beyond the 
scope of media industry analysis, the evolution of the financial market over the past five 
decades has radically transformed structural, organizational, and textual aspects of film 
and television. Brought about by gross negligence within the financial sector and the lack 
of federal oversight (or understanding) of finance, the 2008 Housing Crisis and 
subsequent recession brought Wall Street more critical attention from the popular press 
and the public. While the housing crisis, the manipulation of financial derivatives, and the 
subsequent federal bailout of the banking industry achieved a great deal of media 
attention, the financial crash was merely one symptom of a highly financialized economy, 
which could not be undone with piecemeal legislation or the prosecution of financial 
executives. Indeed, deeper structural changes were necessary to prevent further economic 
crashes and address wealth inequality and the power of finance. Combining political, 
legal, and industrial approaches, Jennifer Holt (2011) charts this evolution of the 
deregulatory environment that led to the concentration of the media industry. However, 
as chapter one of this thesis argues, this neoliberal ethos and the power of finance were 
not just a product of deregulatory policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, in the 
aftermath of the crash, media studies has yet to fully grapple with the effects of 
financialization on the media industry, its practices, and its texts. 
A growing field of scholarship, primarily within political economy and media 




Dwayne Winseck (2010), for example, offers one of the few political economy analyses 
that focus on the growing financialization of the media industry; though, this piece 
notably examines the Canadian media system, not the U.S. media system. However, his 
analysis applies to the broader global economy and the global conglomerates examined in 
this thesis. Andrew deWaard (2017, 2020) has brought the financialization of media to 
the forefront of media studies scholarship, examining the private equity takeovers of 
movie studios, casting agencies, talent agencies, and other Hollywood institutions. His 
extensive research on media financialization represents the first comprehensive 
examination of this phenomenon and will be the focus of much of this project, 
particularly chapters one and three. Considering this lack of scholarship, media financing 
and financialization should be further integrated into studies of media industries. 
Methodology & Scope 
Historiography 
The methodology of this thesis is both historical and industrial and firmly 
indebted to humanistic traditions. Susan Lorene Brinson (2005) points out how 
Enlightenment philosophies led many historians to, at first, approach history as a social 
science, whereby scholars could arrive at some “truth” (2). However, by the 1960s, 
liberal historians challenged these claims of objectivity, pointing out that historians are 
influenced by their personal philosophy in their selection of subject matter, and their 
analysis is itself an interpretation. In the tradition of cultural studies, that which is under 
study may be fully understood only within the contexts of its time and place (4). 




grand narrative of all media or all historical periods but are context-specific to the periods 
and corporations discussed. 
Janet Wasko (2005) identifies historical analysis as one of the core approaches of 
political economy and as an “essential” framework that can document continuity and 
change in media (31). She notes how political economists have traced the history of 
specific media (e.g., the press, music, advertising, telecommunications, broadcasting, and 
film). Even though there is a plentitude of historical research on broadcasting and the 
relationship between the state and broadcasting corporations—including work from 
Downing (1990), Kellner (1990), McChesney (1993), Douglas (1989), and Boddy 
(1993)—I have not yet found a comprehensive critical accounting of the historical 
relationship between financial institutions and the broadcasting industry. In one of her 
earlier contributions to the political economy of communication, Wasko’s (1982) Movies 
and Money: Financing the American Film Industry traces the various loans and financial 
instruments utilized by various film executives to fund Hollywood productions. Although 
this is one of the few detailed historical accounts of the relationship between media and 
financial institutions, it could have more critically evaluated the consequences of such 
relationships, rather than just documenting the various contractual connections between 
the two. 
In terms of integrating the historical aims of this project with the praxis required 
of any political economist, Victor Pickard (2013) provides a particularly useful 
framework that integrates historical and critical scholarship, allowing us to “retrace 




should seek out “deferred alternatives” that address contemporary media issues and 
perhaps even “inspire future reforms” (308). I will mirror Pickard’s investigation into 
1940s media and journalism reform efforts—both successful and silenced—and use his 
approach as a blueprint for my investigation into deferred alternatives regarding media 
ownership structures in the mid-century broadcasting industry. Similar to Brinson’s 
(2005) acknowledgment of authorial subjectivity, Pickard also points out that critical 
scholarship requires a keen self-reflexivity and an awareness of its own limitations.  
Multiperspectival Approach 
Methodologically, this thesis relies on the multiperspectival approach provided by 
Eileen Meehan (1986). Meehan argues that any single level of analysis—whether at the 
individual, organizational, or industrial level—is in and of itself insufficient. Instead, 
political-economic scholars should consider a more integrated approach that provides 
“complex, holistic, and adequate explanations” (394). Meehan proposes that political 
economists integrate three interconnected perspectives: (1) instrumentalism, which 
considers how individuals interact on behalf of an organization, using individual actions 
as the “basic unit of analysis” (397); (2) institutionalism, which investigates how 
organizations are driven by economic imperatives “to control as much of the environment 
as possible in order to rationalize and regularize profitable operations” (398); and (3) 
structuralism, which considers the “meshing and grinding together of organization, 
systems, sectors, and domains,” wherein companies pursue goals that may undermine the 
larger sector (401). As such, chapters one through three use this multiperspectival 




industry trend but also something that is perpetuated and negotiated at the individual and 
organizational level. 
Sources & Scope 
Unlike researchers like Caldwell (2008) who use ethnographic research to study 
industry actors, political economists cannot shadow corporate executives or observe 
conversations in conglomerates boardrooms. Thomas Corrigan (2018) points out how 
industry trade press and industry documents, therefore, provide a vital resource in the tool 
kit of political economic scholars. He adds that “by approaching the trade press 
ethnographically, [political economic] researchers can reap these publications’ benefits 
while avoiding pitfalls” (2753). Similarly, Eileen Meehan, Vincent Mosco, and Janet 
Wasko (1993) indicate that both institutional and instrumental political economic 
analyses use similar data sources: government documents, annual corporate reports, 
business magazines, wholesale and retail price lists, employee and journalist statements, 
and promotional material. However, they contend that such sources are not always 
reliable, and CPE scholars should, therefore, use varied sources and systematically 
evaluate data on a holistic level. In this thesis, I will use journalistic sources, interviews, 
earnings reports, trade journals, executive autobiographies, and other secondary sources 
in a way that acknowledges their subjective point of view and assesses their “authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness, and meaning” (Corrigan 2018, 2753). In other words, no 
single source can or should be taken at face value, so skepticism and varied sources are 





This thesis focuses specifically on ABC and various individual stakeholders 
within the U.S. broadcasting industry. Selecting ABC not only narrows the scope of this 
analysis to a specific entity and a specific national industry but is also beneficial because 
ABC’s varied ownership history has been subject to various financial and managerial 
overseers across several mergers and acquisitions. Although ABC faces a similar 
situation to CBS in its lack of historical documents in comparison to NBC (Socolow 
2016), as a publicly-traded company subject to mandatory corporate filings since its 
inception, ABC has enough primary sources to sustain this analysis. Moreover, its 
eventual absorption into the Disney conglomerate provides a quintessential example of 
contemporary media financialization and an opportunity to evaluate ABC’s synergistic 
value against other Disney film and television properties. 
Conclusion 
Using ABC as my case study in this thesis, I argue that media industry studies 
should turn an eye toward comparative studies of ownership to understand how finance 
and capital accumulation influence the range and nature of cultural output. This is not 
simply a matter of arguing that financing and ownership stifle creativity, the variety of 
content, and/or the range of representation on-screen and behind the camera. Rather, it is 
to gesture toward a more holistic conception of media. To address policy and praxis, this 
thesis also offers a blueprint of a regulatory and economic environment in the mid-
century United States that, while imperfect, inhibited the reach of financial institutions 
and provided more competition across all media sectors. While the broadcast industry 




the multichannel revolution, and thus represented an oligopoly, the underlying ownership 
of these corporations was far more diverse than those in today’s media landscape, and the 
cross-industry ownership and industry concentration in that era pale in comparison to 
today. There were certainly missteps in the oversight by the FCC, including the license 
freeze and the artificial scarcity of the UHF/VHF allocation, but the statutory mandates 
regarding ownership and corporate governance during this time struck a Keynesian 
balance between state intervention and free inter-market competition. By turning our 
attention to the normative dimensions of corporate governance and ownership, we can 
understand how these concepts intersect with culture and society, not in terms of outright 
determinism but of “circuits of culture” and meaning-making (Du Gay et al. 1997). To 
write off structural concerns, though, via post-structural relativism is to ignore that media 
policy can materially improve competition, prices for consumers, democracy, diversity of 
content, and other concerns like profit participation and partial ownership for 
marginalized creatives. 
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter one of this thesis will explore, in more detail, the rise of finance in 
American culture, dating back to Wall Street’s roots in pre-American Revolution 
Manhattan. I contextualize the evolution of finance in the late 19th century when Robber 
Barons and banking trusts coalesced. Subsequently, I place this aspect of economic 
history in conversation with the history of communication and media industries, with 
particular attention to the founding of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and 




By charting the early involvement of investment banking in RCA and ABC, this thesis 
suggests that the financialization of media dates well before the 1970s, as is commonly 
identified. However, at the time, the power of finance, particularly regarding ownership 
limitations, was tempered by federal oversight and targeted regulation. Moreover, this 
first chapter reveals how embedded Darwinian and (what would later be considered) 
neoliberal logics were within the financial sector and how these entities have long tied 
American individualism to laissez-faire attitudes of governance. 
Chapter two of this thesis will consider the board constitution and owners of the 
American Broadcasting Company in the 1950s and 1960. I consider the merger between 
ABC and United Paramount Theaters, with special attention to the financial discourses 
that swirled around television trade magazines and the relationship between ratings and 
stock prices post-merger. Additionally, I outline how past regulatory interventions and 
since-neglected policies offer potential solutions for today’s media landscape, particularly 
regarding ownership and the involvement of financial firms in corporate governance and 
board constitution. I simultaneously acknowledge the limitations of such policies and 
how the limited competition in broadcasting inhibited the range and nature of 
programming. In this chapter, I also evaluate the target audiences of mid-century 
networks, ratings corporations, and advertisers, and how commodity audience 
constructions connect to ownership and financialization. 
Chapter three evaluates the rise of media fragmentation, financialization, and 
market concentration in the media industries from 1980 to 2021. Specifically, I 




which stem from deregulation and the increasing nichification of television, and Disney’s 
vital role in media concentration after it acquired ABC. In this context, I discuss 
financialization as it has been most commonly discussed in media studies and economics, 
in that I address the neoliberal policies that led to the growth of power in the financial 
sector since the 1970s. With the advent of media fragmentation after the rise of cable and 
digital distribution, I outline how media executives and other media analysts position 
their audiences to Wall Street stakeholders, whether in earnings calls, annual reports, or 
the financial media. Leveraging literature on “the commodity audience,” plastic 
representation, and media fragmentation, I consider how cable and streaming services 
construct representations of racial difference to create the illusion of diversity and choice 
within an increasingly concentrated media ecosystem. This illusion of difference and 
faux-progressive public relations represent Disney’s attempt to obfuscate the truth behind 
today’s media landscape: that media ownership is increasingly concentrated and, beneath 
that, financial ownership is concentrated to a handful of mutual funds who extend their 
control far beyond just cultural industries. 
While gender and racial representation has increased on-screen and “in the room” 
in the Peak TV era, thereby providing marginalized voices with more access to cultural 
output in Hollywood and beyond, corporate executives and Wall Street still value a 
specific type of audience: those with disposable income who can not only purchase 
advertised products but also the wide range of other products, services, and entertainment 
offered by a particular synergistic conglomerate. Despite this increase in representation, 




profits remain in the hands of a few elite individuals. As long as broader economic 
inequalities exist in American society along racial and ethnic lines, corporations will 
continue to value a specific set of audience members (i.e., white, middle-upper class 
urbanites) who are in a financial position to engage in these purchases. As these 
economic inequalities persist, audience targeting remains just as racialized as ever, 





CHAPTER ONE: NASCENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN U.S. FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES, 1800–1943 
Introduction 
 The chairman of the board for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), 
Edward J. Noble, proclaimed to his shareholders in early 1946, “The deepest gratification 
which the American Broadcasting Company can feel from the year 1945 is our part in 
helping to bring the country through to the end of a great conflict: Directly, by utilizing 
our facilities and talents to spread messages that helped to curb inflation, sell victory 
bonds and keep war workers on the job; indirectly, by carrying news back from the 
battlefields to the main streets of America” (Report 1946, 5). Noble had just purchased 
ABC from the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) two years earlier and, at the time of 
this statement, was seemingly trying to legitimate his company as a uniquely American 
organization that could bring together a nation that had just experienced a long, 
destructive war. Here, Noble posed radio as the beacon of hope and, more importantly, as 
a mechanism through which the government could sell bonds and uplift the wartime 
economy. Throughout his statement to shareholders, Noble made it seem as though radio 
was an autonomous and active agent in the war effort and, seemingly, that it was the 
savior of the financial world. However, Noble largely ignored the bidirectional 
relationship between media and finance and the level of debt he had accumulated to 
purchase ABC and scale its operations. At worst, Noble intentionally obfuscated the 
financialized position of ABC (and media more generally) in the first half of the 20th 




which started prior to ABC’s formation, and the early industrial and organizational 
structures that were the seeds of financialization that have come to define contemporary 
media industries. 
Contemporary neo-conservative economists and critical political economists alike 
point to the neoliberal policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s and the subsequent 
acceleration of capital accumulation in the financial sector as the genesis of 
financialization. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that the financialization of 
the economy and the ideological dispositions necessary to make such rapid 
financialization possible in the late-20th century predate that period. I argue that the 
rugged individualism and Darwinian philosophies that would eventually undergird 
Reaganian policy and contemporary corporate liberalism have their roots in financial 
markets as early as the late 1700s. Furthermore, I consider how technological innovation, 
particularly in communication and media industries, has historically gone hand-in-hand 
with the speculative nature of financial markets. Even before the evolution of radio, the 
structures and financial characteristics of the transportation industry, primarily railroads, 
offered similar speculative trajectories as communication technologies like the telegraph, 
telephone, and radio, and provided a model for financial capitalism that was based on 
rapid speculative growth—a model that has continued well into the 21st century.4 
 
4 Although I will argue that financialization predates the “Long Downturn” of the 1970s and the rise 
of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, it is worth noting that financial power and the characteristics 
of finance capitalism were nonetheless different in the first half of the 20th century than they are 
today. The financialization that took shape prior to the 1930s was more concerted on the part of 
industrialists, market manipulators, and certain corporate executives, unlike the increasingly 
ambivalent and contradictory processes that have come to define the inertia of contemporary financial 
instruments and institutional investment. Furthermore, as I discuss in chapter three, the size of the 




Overall, the aim of this chapter is to bridge the gap between U.S. economic history and 
early broadcasting history by examining the financialization of radio. Many of the radio 
scholars referenced in this chapter indeed encourage a more holistic understanding of the 
evolution of the medium and its technological, social, and economic antecedents. I add to 
this field by incorporating the capital markets that undergirded, manipulated, and profited 
from broadcasting and other communication systems in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
In this chapter, I first offer a literature review of broadcasting’s “prehistory” and 
an interdisciplinary literature review of financialization. I then provide a brief sketch of 
the evolution of financial markets in the United States and the role of “Wall Street” in the 
cultural imaginary.5 I consider how technological innovations in the late-19th century 
intersected with Wall Street, examining the role financial capital played in developing the 
industries around those technologies. With that historical context in place, I then use a 
brief case study on the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and the Federal 
Communication Commission’s 1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting to demonstrate the 
influence of the banking industry on media corporate governance6 and the power of 
equity traders who manipulated media stocks. I also consider how and why the FCC may 
have erroneously portrayed RCA as an independent entity not beholden to banks or large 
shareholders. In the process of making this argument, I dispel the common hypotheses in 
management and business studies (and the FCC’s argument on the matter) that power had 
 
5 Wall Street operates both as a physical location in Manhattan where financial corporations call home 
and a discursive construction in the American imaginary. 
6 In a general sense, corporate governance refers to who controls the activities of a company and how. 
In business scholarship, it has come to be associated with the balance of power established between 




increasingly shifted to the managerial class in the early 21st century. More broadly, in this 
chapter and throughout this thesis, I identify how the government and investors failed to 
consider how cultural industries like radio and television operate differently than other 
areas of the economy; in the case of the 1941 report, the FCC overlooked how RCA’s 
lack of physical assets limited its ability to access capital and left it more vulnerable to 
Wall Street manipulation. 
It is worth noting that the analysis in this chapter uses a broader approach than the 
other chapters in this thesis in order to cover the broad scope of U.S. economic history 
and to set up the more targeted analyses in chapters two and three. Put another way, this 
chapter primarily takes up Meehan’s (1986) “structuralism” approach, which considers 
the “meshing” and “grinding” together among industries—in this case, the finance and 
media industries (401). I do integrate Meehan’s other two levels of analysis 
(instrumentalism and institutionalism) wherever possible, providing brief examples of 
individual actions or the theoretical agency of individual executives and managers, in 
order to offer a more holistic discussion of the relationship between finance and media. In 
terms of considerations of instrumentalism, the financial sector is not an autonomous 
force, acting solely upon the incentives of capital accumulation; it consists of a complex 
system of internal actors, who may negotiate or reject the positions of their firm or 
industry, and external groups, including the government and activists, who may oppose 
or enable such a system. Wall Street also represents a (somewhat) uniquely American set 
of ideological dispositions that reveal just as much about cultural discourses regarding 




Altogether, this chapter posits that media industry studies and media historians should 
consider the genealogical roots of financialization prior to the 1970s and critically 
examine how the obfuscation of financial accountability via Darwinian and rugged-




Media historians point out that broadcasting did not suddenly arrive in the 1920s 
as a fully-formed commercial enterprise. On the contrary, a series of technological, 
cultural, and economic developments predate commercial radio—and, therefore, 
television. Arguing that many mainstream journalists in the 1920s and broadcasting 
historians in the mid-20th century (Archer 1938; Barnouw 1966; Sterling and Kittross 
1978) overlooked radio’s origins prior to 1920, Susan Douglas (1989) investigates the 
period between 1899 and 1922 to understand “how and why America’s broadcasting 
system assumed the structure and role it ultimately came to possess” (xvi). Similar to 
Hugh G.J. Aitken (1985), Douglas considers how the idea of radio came into the public 
imagination in economic and social settings in the early 20th century (xxi). 
As Robert McChesney (1995) points out, there was nothing inevitable about the 
commercial, advertising-supported network system that came to define broadcasting by 
the 1930s (4). Thomas Streeter (1996) not only dispels the inevitability of this system but 
also disagrees that the evolution of commercial radio was simply a matter of private 




broadcasting was not the product of the genius of free-market capitalism, as corporate 
industrialists and executives claimed, but a product of deliberate political activity and 
corporate liberalism (xii). Similarly, in her discussion of a nascent NBC, Michele Hilmes 
(2007) argues that the tensions between regulatory control and the network’s profit 
interest are often reductively understood as a conflict between the public interest and 
economic base (8). In truth, the government and private enterprises collaborated to 
marginalize amateurs and special interest groups—onto another spectrum—in order to 
maintain control over the industry and capital accumulation. 
This corporate liberalist approach was hardly solidified in the 1920s and early 
1930s, however. McChesney (1995) contends that between 1928 and 1935 several 
interest groups, including those representing labor, education, religious interests, and the 
press, opposed the commercial set-up of radio, even after the passage of the Radio Act of 
1927. However, they struggled to get public support because the networks (and the 
government) refused to genuinely engage with them or consider their appeals (3–7). This 
period represented the last time that there was serious public debate about a mass 
medium, as the commercial system was “fully entrenched” by 1935 (3). This chapter 
adds to these arguments and contends that another critically overlooked aspect of 
commercial broadcasting’s “prehistory” informed its eventual structure and position in 
the cultural imagination: financial forces, particularly bankers and industrialists who 
maintained implicit power over the radio industry and its antecedent industries (i.e., the 






Similar to terms like neoliberalism or globalization, financialization wields many 
definitions across and within different academic fields. Sociologist Greta R. Krippner 
(2011) identifies three different definitions that have commonly been applied to 
financialization (27–28). First, financialization has been associated with the rise of 
“shareholder value” as the dominant drive of private corporations. A second, longer-held 
definition of the term refers to it as the economic and political power of the “rentier 
class”—those who make their income from owning land and other assets but add little 
value to the real economy. The third category refers to financialization as the increased 
use of financial instruments and schemes, such as those that led to the Housing Crisis and 
economic recession in 2007–2008. Krippner herself takes a broader approach to the term, 
arguing that financialization means “the growing importance of financial activities as a 
source of profits in the economy” (27). Although this is an attempt to make the term more 
encompassing, Krippner’s definition limits the definition of financialization to the rise of 
the financial sector as a share of global profits. She uses this definition to point out that 
the financial sector’s profits only represented 10-15% of the total U.S. economy in the 
1950s but constituted almost 40% by 2001 (28). Financialization, according to this 
definition, is therefore limited only to economic profits and the explicit capital 
accumulation of financial institutions starting in the late 20th century. However, as this 
chapter demonstrates, such a definition neglects the other means through which bankers 
and finance have maintained power over other areas of the economy and the importance 




Epstein (2005) provides a broader lens through which to understand this phenomenon: 
“Financialization refers to the increasing importance of financial markets, financial 
motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its 
governing institutions, both at the national and international levels” (3). 
Contrary to the notion that financialization only emerged in the late 20th century, 
Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2005) point out that modern finance more or less 
emerged in the late-19th century (18–19). Therefore, it is vital that studies of neoliberal 
regulation—a common topic in media industry studies—be contextualized within broader 
historical trends, which ultimately reveal that media regulation in the 1970s and 
thereafter was the product of a cyclical system that was only temporarily disrupted by 
New Deal regulation, rather than a completely new turn in the political economy of the 
United States. Fernand Braudel (1984) similarly concludes that the contemporary 
expansion of the financial sector does not represent a substantial change in the operation 
of finance capitalism; instead, it is a symptom of late-stage capitalism (246). 
Within media studies, the application of financialization to media industries has 
been sparse. Andrew deWaard (2017) points out that “there has not been a substantial 
scholarly study of the effect of financialization on the media sector” (2). Although his 
accounts (2017, 2020) focus on contemporary developments, such as the increasing 
number of private equity firms taking over Hollywood, rather than earlier cases of media 
financialization, deWaard’s case studies demonstrate the importance of putting these two 
topics (i.e., finance and media) in conversation with one another. Dwayne Winseck 




media studies, “The concept of financialization directs our attention to the capitalization 
of the media industries alongside the traditional focus of critical media political economy 
on media ownership, markets, regulation, commodification, digitization, and so on” 
(366). He also implies that studies of financialization offer a bridge between political 
economy and cultural studies, concluding that financialization “constitute[s] an image of 
reality around which financial actors organize their behaviour” (366). In other words, it is 
just as much a discursive and cultural formation as it is a material economic reality. Many 
economic historians (Geisst 2018; Fraser 2005; Haiven 2014) similarly approach Wall 
Street as a socio-cultural institution in the American imagination, just as much as an 
economic one. Still, scholars inside and outside of media studies who have focused on 
financialization have typically not focused on earlier periods of financialization, when 
alternative forms of finance power existed in the economy, media industries, and the 
cultural imagination. 
Wall Street: Origins to the 1930s 
Despite Wall Street’s suggestions of American exceptionalism, the economic 
history of the United States and finance capitalism are not unique within global economic 
history. Italian sociologist Giovanni Arrighi (1994) points to three earlier socio-economic 
systems that follow a similar trajectory to the American capitalist economy in the 20th 
and early-21st centuries: Genoa from the 15th to early-17th century, Amsterdam from the 
late-16th through the 18th century, and Britain from the mid-18th century to the early-
20th century (6). Each of these systems, in their time, held significant power over the 




disintegration” (9). Fernand Braudel (1984) details how financial expansion consistently 
represented the final stage of these capitalist economies and was an indication that their 
financial hegemony had peaked; according to Arrighi (1994), financialization represents 
a coming disintegration (9). Similar to Douglas and Streeter’s conclusions, both Braudel 
and Arrighi see state intervention not as antithetical to capitalism but as critical to its 
development and preservation (Arrighi 1994, 10). Therefore, in examining the rise of 
Wall Street and capital markets in the United States, it is important to acknowledge that 
these developments are inherent to state-supported capitalism, rather than something that 
is unique to the 20th-century economies or recent technological developments. 
Although Wall Street would become the center of the U.S. economy—both 
geographically and in the American imagination—it was not always an established, 
formal institution. In the late-18th and early-19th centuries, “Wall Street” was merely a 
series of informal trading activities among merchants and speculators7 who gathered near 
a buttonwood tree at the end of Wall Street in Manhattan to trade physical “notes,” which 
were material pieces of paper that represented actual ownership stakes in an organization 
or business venture. At the time, these notes were typically only from small regional 
banks or those seeking to start a new business (Geisst 2018, 4). After the American 
Revolution, the federal government held a significant amount of debt with foreign 
lenders, so it issued government bonds to citizens and foreign investors to pay back its 
old debt; these bonds could then be sold on “secondary markets” like those informal 
 
7 Speculators are the traders who forecast the potential value of a stock, betting that it will either rise 





exchanges occurring on Wall Street (4).  
This early period was highly speculative and risky, as traders would often defraud 
or mislead one another and frequently engage in stock rigging or price manipulation 
(Geisst 2018, 5). Despite some trading of government bonds, Wall Street was not a 
formal institution at this time, nor did it substantively contribute to or affect the economy. 
As the United States was primarily an agrarian economy with some land speculation8 and 
a small but growing industrial sector, there was not a tremendous need for capital. When 
businesses, which were often small sole proprietorships or partnerships, did need loans, 
they could go to one of the many regional banks across the country (2). As such, most of 
the trading on Wall Street was in government bonds, rather than equity certificates (that 
represented ownership in private corporations). As land speculation continued in the 
American West, however, banks needed more capital to loan to land speculators, so they 
turned to exchanges like those on Wall Street to raise funds to then pass along to 
customers (8).  
After a period of instability and informal trading, Wall Street eventually sought to 
legitimate itself. The Wall Street exchange was formalized in May 1792 with the 
Buttonwood Agreement, which established The New York Stock Exchange; this was an 
effort by regular traders to reduce price manipulation and other malfeasances that were 
common in the Street’s early years (Geisst 2018, 7). The subsequent period between the 
 
8 As much of the American West had yet to be settled yet, most bank loans at the time were for 
individuals to buy property in the West. Typically, these land blocks were sold to business-minded 
individuals who held them as investments or to individuals who wanted to get a fresh start by moving 




Revolution and the U.S. Civil War was largely one that was free of government 
intervention in private trading. However, this did not indicate that Wall Street was 
gentlemanly and fair. There were several instances of stock manipulation and other 
immoral activities by traders, even by those who were in charge of underwriting 
government bond issuances (Geisst 2018, 1–28). Although the Buttonwood Agreement 
was established to reduce manipulation and immoral activity, Charles Geisst (2018) 
points out that many of the economic recessions, or “panics” as they were then called, 
during this time were caused by stock rigging, bear/bull raids, and price manipulation—
not by material changes to the economy (29–92). Therefore, it is critical to position Wall 
Street as a discursive market of ideas where traders sought to manufacture value, rather 
than a place where material goods and services were generated. 
As industrialization accelerated in the mid-19th century around machinery and 
textiles, increasingly complex corporations started to emerge that required outside capital 
to launch and maintain operations. After the Civil War, a small class of wealthy 
individuals, known as Robber Barons, started to consolidate various industries and 
control a significant portion of the economy. During this period of continued growth, 
vertical and horizontal integration became a key strategy for Robber Barons like 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, who all 
amassed fortunes at the expense of small regional businesses and fair competition. 
Instead of integrating acquired businesses into their corporations, these wealthy elites 
created “trusts” that served essentially as collusive holding companies and the legal 




circumvent state laws against monopolies (93–94). Even powerful banks maintained 
monopolistic trusts that consolidated the financial industry. J.P. Morgan himself led the 
organization of several bank trusts, which were created when financial institutions would 
pool their funds into a single holding company to ensure each bank could remain liquid in 
the case of a financial emergency (114). To fund vertical and horizontal acquisitions and 
create these trusts, one may think that the Barons would have needed to borrow from 
Wall Street, which would have expanded the private sector’s reliance on financial 
markets and banks. However, Robber Barons preferred to take over companies by 
exchanging their trust’s equity certificates for the stocks of the acquired company (95). 
Rockefeller was particularly averse to finance capitalism and did everything possible to 
avoid dealing with Wall Street (95). In spite of this, trust certificates (i.e., the trust’s 
“stock”) were still traded on Wall Street and subject to speculative activities (94).  
In response to the anti-competitive practices of trusts and monopolies, progressive 
lawmakers in Congress sought to regulate Wall Street. Most prominently, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890 prevented private corporations from entering into anti-competitive 
agreements or creating a monopolistic marketplace; the Act provided the Justice 
Department with the power to police such activities (98). Although the Sherman Act 
represented one of the first major legislative advances in the oversight of the financial 
economy and the corporate world, it would be several decades before it could effectively 
limit the power of the corporate elite. As Charles Geisst (2018) argues, “The Sherman 
Act still could not come to grips with some of the more subtle devices used to dominate 




American industrial scene” (125). Geisst points out that these subtle strategies included 
placing bankers on the boards of several different companies, some within the same 
industry, thus “ensuring an influence out of all proportion to the actual importance of the 
banks themselves” (125). In addition, there was nothing in the Sherman Act or 
subsequent legislation that prevented elites like Morgan from maintaining a significant 
percentage ownership in several corporations within the same industry. Despite the 
introduction of new government scrutiny, the last two decades of the 19th century were 
considered Wall Street’s “Golden Age,” and bankers became the important “lynchpins” 
holding the economy together (105). Indeed, banks remained the ones buying (i.e., 
underwriting) blocks of securities (i.e., stocks and bonds), selling them to individual 
investors, and retaining the remaining shares that they were not able to sell to individual 
shareholders (105). 
By the 1920s, rampant speculation, unfettered access to cheap capital, and 
minimal federal oversight of stock manipulation led to a record number of transactions on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Despite an increased number of small-time investors 
entering the market, 5% of the country still controlled 90% of its wealth, and 
approximately 200 companies controlled half of the corporate wealth (151). In late 1929, 
traders and private investors began to lose confidence in the trajectory of the economy 
and the integrity of those controlling it, and the inertia of the bear market set in (i.e., the 
process by which the market becomes increasingly pessimistic, leading to speculation 
that prices will decline), which led to the onset of the Great Depression. In response to 




administration initiated several measures under the New Deal to not only reboot the 
economy but also ensure more comprehensive oversight of financial institutions. Federal 
investigations into Wall Street activity revealed that bankers were using their customers’ 
savings accounts as their own personal investment accounts, while other bankers simply 
pulled out of the stock market altogether at the expense of the economy as a whole, 
which resulted in widespread pessimism in the market and accelerated the Crash (201). 
As will be discussed subsequently in chapters two and three, New Deal legislation and 
Keynesian economics would diminish the popularity of Wall Street’s individualistic and 
Darwinian ideologies, but they would not eliminate them altogether. Furthermore, New 
Deal legislation did not eliminate the soft power that bankers and the financial elite 
wielded during the still “golden age” of capitalism. 
Common Themes in Wall Street’s Cultural History 
American Exceptionalism 
Now that I have provided a brief sketch of the cultural and economic history of 
Wall Street up to the Great Depression, I identify a few key themes and patterns that 
contextualize the cultural history of Wall Street. First, throughout the history of Wall 
Street, financial stakeholders have relied on the Americanized notion of rugged 
individualism and Darwinian self-preservation as the justification for their greed and self-
interest. Much of this was connected, initially, to a xenophobic fear of foreign capital. 
Throughout its early years, Wall Street was reliant on international investments, primarily 
from England, to bankroll its operations, fund its government, and undergird its securities 




panic, these foreign investors were the first to pull out their investments, which provided 
American investors with ire and prejudice against non-U.S. capital. In financial media 
publications in the 19th and 20th century, many investors were portrayed as devious and 
untrustworthy foreigners who sought financial hegemony over the U.S. market.9 
Although subsequent anti-immigrant discourses would be less explicit in the 20th 
century, these undercurrents would continue on a structural level. Indeed, as I will briefly 
sketch in the RCA case study below, this fear of “foreigners” would also lead many 
corporate charters to see foreign investment as a weakness and domestic investment as a 
point of pride. As RCA’s 1943 annual report lauded, “less than 6% of the stock is held by 
foreign stockholders” (RCA 1943, 9). 
In addition, “survival of the fittest” was a common rallying cry among those who 
took advantage of others on Wall Street; these philosophical threads would become 
antecedents of corporate liberalism and the laissez-faire logic of neoliberalism in the late-
20th century. Speaking of the nascent market in the 19th century, Geisst (2018) observes: 
When the economy turned nasty, Darwin could always be invoked. Only the 
fittest survived in a constantly changing world. Since most significant American 
thinking up to that time—the theories of The Federalist Papers, Thomas Jefferson, 
Thomas Paine, and James Fenimore Cooper—had taken place within political 
economy and constitutional theory, these new overly simplified ideas had great 
appeal. They were not intellectual, and they were easy to comprehend. They 
reduced social and economic factors to a simple, almost crude, basis but would 
nevertheless set the stage for a century of unparalleled growth. America had the 
pop ideology it needed to succeed… (28) 
These oversimplified applications of evolutionary theory would continue to find a home 
 
9 Moreover, anti-Semitism was particularly pronounced throughout the Street’s history. For example, 
one populist in the 1800s claimed that President Grover Cleveland was a “tool of Jewish bankers and 




in 20th-century politics. Herbert Hoover’s political positions and his 1922 book American 
Individualism embodied these philosophies, vilifying government intervention and 
misappropriating 19th-century values of hard work and self-determination onto political 
economic theories of governing Wall Street (150). Ironically, these philosophies and the 
very ethos of Wall Street ran contrary to the perceived values of the Founding Fathers 
who were evoked in such discourses of individualism but, in reality, found greed and 
ostentatious displays of wealth to be “vulgar or evidence of dishonesty” (7). 
Technology & Speculation 
Between the end of the Civil War and the early 1900s, a number of technologies, 
including railroads, the telegraph, the telephone, and finally radio, became the key drivers 
of speculation on Wall Street. Their seemingly endless upside was precisely the fuel that 
financial markets needed to lure capital for economic expansion. Geisst (2018) observes, 
“Both financial capitalism and corporate consolidation did not emerge until the rise of 
technology and innovation. It was not until the rise of railroads, the telegraph, and 
electricity in the late 1800s that financial markets took off” (95). At first, the industrial 
revolution necessitated a more comprehensive transportation system than canals and 
turnpikes could support,10 which thus accelerated the expansion and investment in 
railroads. Railroad stocks quickly became the favorites among investors and 
industrialists, who helped consolidate the industry and turn small local lines into 
monopolized national trusts (59, 93). For the first time, the market concluded that a 
 
10 In the 1830s, turnpikes and canal entities were some of the first formalized “corporations”—a form 




technological advancement had tremendous upside (due to the railroad’s potential 
westward expansion), which altogether fueled market speculation and the funneling of 
capital into railroad stocks. 
Although the telegraph and telephone were seemingly unrelated to railroads, it is 
important to position railroads as an antecedent to communication technologies because 
the telegraph and telephone not only were constructed along the same routes as regional 
and transcontinental railroads but also fueled by the same speculative fever in the late-
19th century. When the telegraph was invented by Samuel Morse in 1844, it would 
become widespread across the United States within four years (39). Like railroad 
construction, the expansion of the telegraph, and later the telephone, required substantial 
capital expenditures, and Wall Street was the only market where audacious entrepreneurs 
could acquire capital for such risky investments. The telephone would become another 
favorite stock of Wall Street, as it was the “railroads and telegraph all rolled into one” 
(Geisst 2018, 101).  
The inventors behind these technologies—such as Alexander Graham Bell of the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and Thomas Edison of General 
Electric (GE)—relied on outside managers and financiers to expand their businesses; as a 
result, most inventors never gained as much wealth as the individuals that helped finance 
them (Geisst 2018, 101–102). As Thomas Streeter (1996) points out, long before radio, 
Western Union’s telegraph and AT&T’s telephone were the first privately-owned and 
monopolized communications systems in the United States (70). He adds that by the early 




and GE by integrating proven strategies for industrial dominance into AT&T’s corporate 
governance: vertical integration, patent libraries, and limiting competition through 
domination of distribution (70). However, AT&T management added a critical strategy 
for corporate monopolies: the “institutionalization of public relations,” which was used to 
control government regulation and overcome the “Robber Baron image” of earlier 
monopolies (70). Unlike radio stocks, investors considered telegraph, telephone, and 
railroad stocks to be “reliable” and more profitable because they were backed by 
collateralized assets (Geisst 2018, 59)—this is a notable distinction between 19th-century 
communication stocks and 20th-century cultural industry stocks like radio and television, 
which were largely based on intellectual property and intangible assets. As suggested by 
the evolution of these technologies, finance capitalism and technological innovation go 
hand in hand. On the one hand, technological expansion requires extensive capital for 
growth. On the other hand, financial markets require speculation and discursive upside 
for growth. 
Self-regulation & Government Intervention 
Another common theme throughout Wall Street’s history has been the tendency 
for bankers and traders to (successfully) advocate for self-regulation. For example, after 
New Deal legislation and inquiries by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
“the Street recognized the trend and tried its best to respond by forming a self-regulatory 
body. Some of the senior members of prominent firms were opposed to any form of 
regulation” (Geisst 2018, 252). This strategy was often successful because of the 




expertise and extensive tenure on Wall Street could articulate or even understand the 
mechanisms used for wealth accumulation. Although there were exceptions, many of the 
Wall Street insiders hired by the government to regulate financial institutions were 
friendly in their regulation and oversight, and Wall Street regulatory bodies were often 
subject to “regulatory capture” (494). This form of self-regulation was notably similar to 
other industry’s self-regulatory bodies, such as the National Association of Broadcasters 
(NAB) within the broadcasting industry, that advocated for self-governance and 
corporate liberalism. To avoid regulation, these different entities often relied on this same 
notion of idiosyncratic industry expertise and advocated for non-interventionist stances 
based on free-market logic. 
The Two Way “Street”: Finance & Communication  
Although Wall Street certainly had a profound effect on the ability of 
communication corporations to expand and succeed, communication and media industries 
had their own effects on the market, outside of speculation. First, the telegraph and 
telephone accelerated the ability of traders to quickly execute transactions and 
communicate with their clients. As Geisst (2018) summarizes, the telegraph “put an 
entire generation of carrier pigeons out of work” (40). The Economist reported in the 
1850s that “owners of magnetic telegraphs throughout the Union are said to obtain from 
10 to 14 percent [additional gains] on their [initial investment]” (40). As will be shown in 
the example below, RCA was also critical in helping develop the wireless telegraph for 
overseas traders and investors. Second, media outlets that reported on financial markets 




those who wanted to exploit the press for their financial advantage. Even in the early-
19th century, stock manipulators would place “flattering or unflattering” news in the 
press to obtain a specific public response on the market (25). Although it was difficult to 
measure the effectiveness of these manipulations, especially as the market matured, 
mainstream investors today still use a variety of tactics to elicit a specific public response 
depending on their investment strategy (i.e., trying to increase or decrease a stock’s 
price). Although this brief summary glides over decades of interactions between the 
media and finance as an inter-reliant system, these interactions demonstrate the 
importance of media and communication systems within the imaginative and poetic 
discourses perpetuated by Wall Street traders, bankers, and manipulators. 
Case Study: RCA & Allocative Control 
The inception of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) embodies many of the 
trends identified above regarding American exceptionalism, self-regulation, speculation, 
and communication per definitionem. This section will briefly summarize the rise of 
radio stocks on the stock market and the earlier communication technologies that charted 
similar speculative paths. Subsequently, I will point to the evolution of RCA’s stock as an 
example of the alliance between government and free enterprise and the collusive 
practices within the communication sector as a whole. Finally, I will interrogate the 
ambivalent motivations of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) in its antitrust 
investigation into RCA and its erroneous claims regarding RCA’s stock ownership and 
relationship to financial markets. Although its 1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting makes 




volition in its anti-competitive practices, the evidence below proves this to be misguided 
and evidences the FCC’s broader agenda of breaking up NBC. 
Early Radio, 1899–1919 
The invention of the radio, also known as the “wireless telegraph,” is often 
attributed to Guglielmo Marconi, who first demonstrated, in New York City in 1899, the 
exchange of a long-distance message delivered without wires. Marconi subsequently 
established the Marconi Company and American Marconi, becoming the first “reliable 
producer” of radio transmitters and receivers (Brinson 2005, 6–7). His imagining of radio 
was much different from the form it would later take. Rather than seeing it as a consumer 
product, Marconi targeted “large commercial steamship companies and newspapers” 
(Douglas 1989, xvi). Moreover, his radio only transmitted Morse Code in a point-to-point 
system, rather than voices in a one-to-many system. Shortly thereafter, General Electric 
and Westinghouse also entered the radio manufacturing industry (Brinson 2005, 7). As 
the industry started to coalesce, the Radio Act of 1912 first brought radio into the realm 
of government oversight, providing a federal agency with the ability to oversee the radio 
spectrum (7). These allocations tended to favor corporate interests and, once again, 
represented the collusion between private and state interests. For the first two decades of 
the 20th century, particularly during World War I, radio was primarily used by the U.S. 
government and the Navy. As Streeter (1996) points out, there was a “military monopoly 
of radio as early as 1904” (68). In fact, during the First World War, the Navy took legal 
ownership over all radio in the name of national interest (82). Despite government control 




two decades of the 20th century came from amateurs who had “established grass-roots 
radio networks” by 1910 (Douglas 1989, xxviii). However, these experimenters were 
banned from using the airwaves during the war and were soon driven to the fringes of the 
U.S. radio system because of the government’s business-friendly allocation of the radio 
spectrum (Streeter 1996, 82). 
From a business perspective, radio was unique from earlier communication and 
transportation technologies because financial interests and industrialists could not, at first, 
control its production and distribution in the same way that they could for other asset-
intensive technologies like the telegraph and telephone. As a small lightweight device, 
“radio required no massive manufacturing plants or capital-intensive overland 
constructions” (Streeter 1996, 60). Additionally, radio was “too unpredictable and too 
different from existing technologies to fit easily into entrenched institutional structures” 
(71). The omnidirectionality and lack of control over radio waves only exacerbated this 
perception. Because of its inability to be harnessed by corporation structures, the early 
development, experimentation, and eventual success of radio were the result of work 
done by “amateurs” who utilized radio outside of private corporate structures (50). This is 
not to say that corporations were unable to adjust to changes or disruptions in the status 
quo. Rather, it was the total inability to control or profit from radio that corporate 
America—and financial markets—were skeptical of. As William Paley later said, 
“Capital can adjust itself to orderly progress. It always does. But it retreats in the face of 
chaos” (71). 




corporation, radio’s invention and RCA’s corporate form were tied to the “foreign” 
American Marconi, a subsidiary of the British Marconi Company. After World War I, the 
American Navy had to return its government-controlled stations back to the private 
sector; however, they were hesitant to return them to the UK-based Marconi Company 
(Streeter 1996, 79–80). This move embodied two continuing trends in U.S. financial 
history: Americans’ fear of foreign capital and the U.S. government’s (selective) support 
of private enterprises in the name of national interest. At the end of the war, when 
amateurs were still banned from the radio spectrum, Navy officials brought their case to 
the CEO of General Electric, Owen D. Young, asking asked him to stop selling 
equipment to Marconi and buy American Marconi outright. As Marconi had virtually no 
option but to accept the deal, American Marconi became the Radio Corporation of 
America on November 20, 1919 (Archer 1938, 159–167). Much of the corporate 
structure remained the same as American Marconi, and RCA included many of the same 
staff members as American Marconi, including its General Manager David Sarnoff, who 
would later become the Chairman and CEO of RCA. 
Early RCA 
As American Marconi had poor technological capabilities and was competitively 
behind at the time of RCA’s creation, Young and GE sought to pool RCA/GE’s industry 
patents with other communications corporations in 1920 (Streeter 1996, 87). RCA 
brokered those deals not through licensing agreements but through stock issuances, which 
gave the other conglomerates a collusive ownership stake in RCA. First, in 1920, RCA 




two board seats to AT&T (Aitken 1985, 446); though, AT&T divested its ownership and 
two board seats shortly thereafter in 1922 (449). In addition, United Fruit Company, 
which held a number of patents in radio technology, signed an agreement with RCA in 
1921 for 200,000 shares of RCA preferred stock, 200,000 shares of RCA common stock, 
and one seat on the RCA board (447). Finally, Westinghouse, which already held cross-
licensing agreements with RCA, purchased 700,000 shares of RCA preferred stock and 
700,000 shares of common stock (477). Altogether, by the spring of 1921, GE owned 
30.1% of RCA, Westinghouse owned 20.6%, AT&T owned 10.3%, and United Fruit 
owned 4.1%. The remaining 34.9% of the company was owned by individual 
shareholders and investors (481). According to Young, these stock issuances were the 
only acceptable means of pooling patents—as opposed to loans or other licensing 
agreements—and also ensured a non-competitive, oligopolistic marketplace for corporate 
interests (448). 
In addition to an openly collusive arrangement, RCA’s corporate structure also 
betrayed the government’s continued involvement in RCA, despite the growing ideology 
of conservatives and market operators who preached free market trade and government-
free individualism. For example, President Woodrow Wilson appointed a Navy admiral 
to regularly attend RCA shareholders’ meetings in 1920 and meet with its board of 
directors (Archer 1938, 187–188). In exchange for playing “nursemaid to the 
arrangement,” the Navy also received one seat on RCA’s board of directors (Streeter 
1996, 83). Additionally, the incorporation papers for RCA required its executives to be 




betrayed state interests in private governance and the continued implicit jingoism in U.S. 
corporate structures (RCA 1943, 5, 27).  
Despite the government’s role in early radio broadcasting and RCA’s 
establishment, the government began its formal antitrust investigation into RCA in 1923, 
not long after its founding. Democrats who were wary of RCA's radio trust mandated that 
the Radio Act of 1927 included “antitrust considerations in its definition of the public 
interest.” Congress also ordered the newly formed Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to 
review RCA’s collusive practices in a formal report (Streeter 1996, 98). During this 
investigation, in 1932, a consent agreement with the Department of Justice required GE 
and Westinghouse to divest their holdings in RCA altogether (FCC 1941, 11). According 
to the FCC, this made RCA an independent company not beholden to any outside 
interests (who could have held RCA in check). However, RCA’s board interests and 
liabilities in the 1930s and 1940s prove this statement to be overblown. Altogether, as 
evidenced by both the FRC’s antitrust accusations/regulations and the government’s 
“nursemaid” relationship to RCA just a decade earlier, the state continued to play a 
contradictory, seemingly ambivalent, role in the radio industry in the first half of the 20th 
century. 
The Financialization of RCA 
In the late 30s, the FCC began additional investigations into chain broadcasting to 
determine if the radio networks should be regulated under the same public interest 
mandate as radio stations, the latter of which the FCC already had explicit oversight of 




CBS and RCA subsidiary NBC, the FCC nonetheless reviewed RCA and its ownership in 
its investigation, as the commissioners were ordered to identify anti-competitive and/or 
monopolistic practices in the radio industry as a whole. As the FCC was likely under 
Congressional pressure to address the same type of corporate practices and market 
structures that led to the 1929 Crash, its investigation was seemingly predetermined to 
charge RCA, and therefore NBC, with having too much market power. The FCC targeted 
NBC in particular because it operated two radio networks—NBC Blue and NBC Red—
many times in the same markets. As a result, the FCC took the position that RCA was an 
autonomous corporation and controlled by an elite and powerful group of executives who 
were not beholden to shareholders, customers, or the public interest. 
Specifically, the FCC claimed RCA was a “management company” (FCC 1941, 
20). This claim was consistent with scholarship conducted within business studies at the 
time that had suggested corporate America was experiencing a “managerial revolution” 
and that mid-level managers were more powerful than owners (e.g., Berle and Means 
1932; Burnham 1941). Managers were able to achieve such a powerful position in 
corporate America because there was increasingly a separation between owners and 
managers. This separation was largely a product of the growth of the stock market and 
shareholder-based ownership models. As a result, managers (and, according to business 
scholars, the middle class) had a more equitable economic arrangement that gave them 
“control” over production. The FCC, on the other hand, saw this trend as detrimental to 
fair competition and the public interest. Relying on the “managerial revolution” 




shareholders necessary to check the power of its executives. 
The FCC investigators also concluded that RCA was “independent of the money 
market” because it had few physical assets, which (at $100,000,000) were negligible 
compared to other industries like railroads, banking, or utilities (FCC 1941, 20). As a 
result, RCA did not hold a substantial amount of “funded debt” (20). The FCC assumed 
that outstanding debt would have meant that financial interests could have exerted 
positive control over RCA and restrained erratic management decisions. In other words, 
they saw debt and financial control as a positive development that would have spread 
power across more stakeholders, beyond just managers. In addition, the FCC pointed out 
that RCA had 250,000 stockholders, but no single stockholder owned more than 0.5% of 
the company (20). Based on this evidence, the report concluded that RCA’s “policies are 
determined by a management subject to little restraint other than self-imposed” (20). This 
dynamic, they claimed, would lead RCA to continue to expand vertically and horizontally 
without restraint, putting smaller competitors out of business across various sectors. 
These assertions implied that RCA did not have the proper corporate checks and 
balances, such as a diverse board of directors or active shareholders, to question 
management decisions. At the time, boards and active shareholders were both regarded as 
the most effective means of good corporate governance.11 However, these claims and 
conclusions ignore the political economic reality of media in the first half of the 1900s. If 
 
11 These theories of good governance were largely based upon agency theory, which is/was the widely 
held assumption in business and management scholarship that an agent (i.e., a manager) will act in its 
own self-interest, not in the best interest of a principal (i.e., shareholders). The solution to the agency 
problem, according to business scholars, is to have a shareholder-appointed board of directors oversee 




anything, this independence from capital markets should have been a reason to celebrate. 
Additionally, the evidence below suggests that financial agents and Wall Street 
institutions, not managers or the working class, maintained allocative control over 
corporate governance in the first half of the 20th century. 
Considering the role of Wall Street and financial markets in the early 20th 
century, there were three fundamental flaws with the FCC’s conclusions. First, the 
“management revolution” thread of business and management studies overstates the 
power of managers and their ability to control production. Second, the FCC ignores the 
“soft power” strategies and the influence that financial actors maintained over RCA and 
its board through allocative control. Third, the FCC overlooked the material reality of 
RCA’s financial state in the late 1930s/early 1940s, as it was overleveraged.12 
The FCC’s claim that RCA was a “management company” was incorrect and fails 
to consider the difference between allocative and operational control. Graham Murdock 
(1983) points out that allocative control represents the power to set company policies 
(including financial policies) and long-term strategies, including the allocation of 
company resources (122). Allocative control rests in the hands of the board of directors 
and the voting shareholders who elect those board members (122–123). On the other 
hand, operational control “works at a lower level” and represents how to effectively use 
the resources already allocated (122). This control is typically in the hands of mid-level 
managers and non-board executives. Ultimately, those who retain allocative control can 
decide how to deploy a company’s financial resources. Accordingly, boards of directors 
 




maintain a more powerful position than managers—which contradicts the theory of 
management supremacy. Therefore, the FCC overlooked the allocative control wielded 
by RCA’s board of directors and the allocative control of its management. Although RCA 
executives held four of the twelve seats on its board in 1943, they still did not have a 
majority (RCA 1943, 12). The FCC investigators suggested that RCA was overly 
independent and its management was accountable to no one except itself—claims that 
were seemingly consistent with the FCC’s broader effort to bolster antitrust claims 
against RCA/NBC. However, RCA management was, in reality, not able to unilaterally 
allocate financial resources and strategies, including (but not limited to) those decisions 
relating to bank loans, stock issuances, dividends, and reinvestment in RCA’s operations. 
While interlocking directorships13 remain equally problematic, the diversity of RCA’s 
board suggests that its managers were not acting on their own and the FCC’s claims were 
oversimplified. 
Indeed, when examining RCA’s board of directors in the early 1940s, there were 
a substantial number of individuals who had ties to banking institutions and financial 
elite. Murdock (1983) points to a similar situation for the board of directors for AT&T in 
1932. Although AT&T’s shares were spread across several shareholders, similar to 
RCA’s shares, more than three-fourths of AT&T’s board had direct links to the Morgans 
and Rockefellers—two powerful families on Wall Street (134). Although these 
connections did not guarantee influence or manipulation, Murdock asserts that they, at 
 
13 This is when an individual, typically a banker, holds a seat on the board of multiple corporations 





the very least, created the possibility of control and influence (134). Furthermore, by the 
time of the FCC investigation, GE, United Fruit, AT&T, and Westinghouse had all 
already divested their interests in RCA and held no board seats (RCA 1943, 12).14 
Ironically, if these entities still had stakeholders on the RCA board, the FCC would have 
likely cited this as evidence of anticompetitive practices. 
Examining the composition of RCA’s board of directors, only four of the twelve 
members were explicitly on the internal management team: David Sarnoff, George K. 
Throckmorton, Edward F. McGrady, and Edward J. Nally (RCA 1943, 12). Considering 
the difference between allocative and operational control, this effectively disrupts the 
management thesis presented by the FCC. Indeed, RCA’s management could have easily 
been outvoted on matters relating to the allocation of company resources by the other 
67% of the board that represented outside interests. Despite the FCC’s claim that RCA 
was “independent of the money market” (FCC 1941, 20), five RCA board members 
(42%) represented the financial establishment—some explicitly and others implicitly 
through established relationships and/or banking backgrounds. Arthur E. Braun, for 
example, was a former banker and was contemporaneously the Chairman of Mellon Bank 
in New York (“Arthur E. Braun” 1976). Second, Charles Dawes was a banker and former 
Vice President of the United States who oversaw several banks and was known for taking 
out multimillion-dollar loans from his own institutions (“Charles G. Dawes” 1951). 
Third, DeWitt Millhauser was a former banker and the head of RCA’s finance 
 
14 In addition, only two board members remained from the American Marconi board, only 13 years 




committee—an important position in determining the company’s allocative policies 
regarding financing; while serving on RCA’s finance committee, he also sat on the board 
of directors for several other financial institutions (“De Witt Millhauser” 1946). Fourth, 
Edward Harden, a holdover from the Marconi board, was a former Wall Street trader and, 
while on the RCA board, still an investment banker of Colgate and Co. (Babize 1922, 
192). Finally, Bertram Cutler was a banker and an industrialist who had close ties with 
Rockefeller interests and held board seats on several banks and railroad corporations 
(“B.S. Cutler” 1932). 
In addition to these influences on the board, RCA had accumulated significant 
debts in its early years, despite the FCC’s claim that RCA had minimal assets and 
therefore required little to no “funded debt” (FCC 1941, 20). According to RCA’s 1943 
financial statement, the company had a debt-to-equity ratio of approximately 1.62, which 
is higher than the normally accepted ratio range of 1.0 to 1.5.15 In other words, these 
figures suggest that RCA was leveraged more than the average corporation.16 
Considering its board composition and debt-to-equity ratio, RCA’s financialized position 
is evident, thus contradicting the FCC’s glib assessment that RCA was autonomous and 
free from outside influence. Therefore, the FCC missed a valuable opportunity to 
meaningfully interrogate the financialization of media and look “beneath the hood” to 
 
15 RCA held $75,200,000 in Bank Loans and Contract Payable, $130,724,857 in Total Liabilities, and 
$81,357,902 in Total Equity (or what the report calls “Total Net Worth”) (RCA 1943, 11). 
16 Although it is possible that RCA’s liabilities could have skyrocketed between the time of the FCC’s 
investigation (1938–1941) and the publication of this annual report (1943), which would have 
substantially changed this ratio, it is unlikely that there would have been this type of change in RCA’s 
financial composition during that time. If anything the sale of NBC Blue should have increased the 




evaluate ownership beyond industry concentration and mergers and acquisitions. 
In addition to board influence and debt holdings, financial markets also exerted 
notable influence over RCA through more devious, though admittedly uncommon, 
practices like stock rigging. For example, one of the most well-known stock 
manipulations in the early-20th century was an “investment pool”17 that was orchestrated 
to manipulate the RCA stock price. Just before the stock market crash, the specialist for 
RCA stock was Michael Meehan.18 Meehan believed that RCA’s stock price was 
undervalued and wanted to organize a pool to “run it up.” The RCA pool consisted of 
several wealthy individuals who put together $12 million. Meehan and his pool were able 
to push a few favorable newspaper articles that quickly increased RCA’s stock price from 
$81 to $92 (Geisst 2018, 180). Eventually, once the price went up over $100, most of the 
pool pulled out, netting the group $5 million altogether (180). However, RCA’s stock 
would eventually plummet to under $10 per share by 1932. These fluctuations, based not 
on real value but on discursive manipulation, typified the erratic and speculative nature of 
the stock market that was endemic to pre-Crash Wall Street. Furthermore, it demonstrated 
the power of traders who could not only determine the price of a stock for shareholders 
but also reduce the ability of a company like RCA to access equity financing. Altogether, 
the board of directors’ composition, debt-to-equity ratio, and stock manipulations all 
 
17 An investment pool is an organized stock rigging, whereby a group of wealthy investors come 
together and agree to either purchase (or short sell) a specific stock in order to raise (or lower) its price 
and achieve a short-term gain (Geisst 2018, 180–181). 
18 The relationship between Wall Street and RCA also went the other way. Michael Meehan had also 
earlier persuaded Sarnoff to let him use his radio telegraphy services on ships and operate brokerage 
affiliates on the high seas, which expanded the reach of NYSE beyond just Manhattan and the 




indicate that RCA was subject to financial influence and belie suggestions that the 
financialization of the economy (and media) was a phenomenon unique to the late-20th 
century. 
Conclusion 
Shortly after the FCC’s investigation into RCA, NBC, and CBS, the agency 
would effectively force RCA to divest itself of one of its two networks.19 By 1943, RCA 
would sell NBC Blue and its assets to an outsider, Edward Noble, who would then turn 
the company into a competitive network, the American Broadcasting Company. Although 
the FCC’s decision created more, though not much more, competition in the space, it 
overlooked where else hegemonic power may have existed, besides vertically-integrated 
corporations, and how financial structures may have exacerbated broader socioeconomic 
inequalities and limited fair competition across and within industries. More broadly, the 
FCC’s misguided conclusions also betray the government’s inability, at least initially, to 
recognize that cultural institutions do not operate in the same way as other industries like 
manufacturing or textiles, as they do not require extensive physical assets to succeed. 
Broadcasting’s lack of physical assets and its uniqueness as a cultural product would 
continue to affect how the government and the financial sector understood the industry, 
ultimately limiting the industry’s access to resources, as detailed in the next chapter. 
As evidenced by the soft and explicit power of Wall Street and the extensive 
banking interests represented in the radio industry, the financialization of media extends 
 
19 The FCC’s new mandates ensured that any station owned by a company that owned more than one 
network could not receive a station license. RCA’s willingness to part with NBC Blue emphasized the 




far before the late-20th century, back to radio’s inception and its antecedents in the 
communication and transportation industries. This case study and the historical overview 
provided in this chapter add to the body of literature that advocates for a more holistic 
perspective on radio and television’s prehistory and a recognition of the collaborative, 
though not always polite, relationship between the state and the media. I have also traced 
the ideological patterns that have existed throughout U.S. financial history: American 
exceptionalism, speculative investment based on technological innovation, and self-
regulation. These patterns, as well as Keynesian intervention and the FCC’s initial action 
against RCA and NBC, would set the stage for the next several decades of American 






CHAPTER TWO: WALL STREET LEGITIMATION & THE FINANCIALIZED 
COMMODITY AUDIENCE, 1943–1970 
 
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres is an investment company.  
Leonard Goldenson (Kroeger 1961, 62) 
 
Introduction 
Often praised in journalistic and trade accounts as a “great man” who changed the 
fortunes of ABC forever, Leonard H. Goldenson facilitated Paramount Theatres’ 
acquisition of ABC in the early 1950s. During his reign, he took on a legendary, almost 
God-like, status in the broadcasting pantheon. Television magazine hailed Goldenson as 
the “miracle worker on West 66th Street” who brought ABC from near bankruptcy to the 
top of the Nielsen ratings (Kroeger 1961, 60). On the book jacket of Goldenson’s co-
authored autobiography (Goldenson and Wolf 1991), journalist Barbara Walters even 
praised Goldenson as the “quiet giant of broadcasting,” while (former) Disney CEO 
Michael Eisner called him a “communications giant.” Even the title of his book, Beating 
the Odds, connotes a David versus Goliath story about Goldenson’s heroic transformation 
of ABC. However, these accounts fail to recognize not only the multiplicity of 
stakeholders who ambivalently helped ABC succeed in the 1950s and 1960s but also the 
role Goldenson’s administration played in ceding power to financial institutions and 
accelerating the financialization of television. Even scholarly accounts of Paramount 
Theatres’ reign over ABC (Hilmes 2015; Anderson 1994; Baughman 1990) overlook the 




and commodity audience constructions. Indeed, ABC’s parent company American 
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres (AB-PT) would set the corporate standard for years to 
come by diversifying into new industries and pursuing other financialized strategies—all 
in order to please Wall Street and cater to the market’s counterintuitive definition of 
“shareholder value.” 
In this chapter, I argue that the discourses around television stocks and the 
discursive transactions between television executives and Wall Street stakeholders 
represented another “market” for audiences in the television industry. Addressing Wall 
Street’s implicit influence over television and the value it placed on audience ratings (in 
the absence of brick and mortar assets), I argue that a “financialized commodity 
audience” was present as early as the 1950s.20 Specifically, I examine the transitionary 
period between 1953 and 1970 when ABC first started to define its imagined audience in 
more certain terms—first by simply targeting a “mass” audience and then by seeking a 
broadly-defined “youth” audience. I argue the financialization of television, in part, 
ignited this change in commodity audience constructions. The financialization of ABC, in 
particular, opened the door to the financialization of the broadcasting sector as a whole. 
To test this hypothesis, I first address the rise of publicly traded broadcasting 
stocks and the risks of going public in the 1950s. I then detail how and why being 
publicly traded left television organizations vulnerable to the vicissitudes of finance 
capitalism. One of the key texts I rely on in this chapter is a two-part article from two 
 





1964 editions of Television, written by Morris J. Gelman, a broadcasting journalist. As 
Wall Street was rarely discussed explicitly in the industry trades, these articles provide 
valuable insight on the financial discourses within the broadcasting industry at the time. I 
also consider how the growth of institutional investors in the broadcasting industry led to 
the increasing financialization of the industry. Throughout this analysis, I also evaluate 
the fluctuating, at times ambivalent, role that the FCC played in monitoring 
broadcasting's ownership structures and overseeing broadcasting’s relationship to the 
financial sector. Altogether, this chapter provides a link between the single-industry 
corporations in the early-20th century that focused on profitability and internal 
reinvestment, as discussed in chapter one, and the diversified conglomerates in the late-
20th century that manufactured niche commodity audiences to create the illusion of 
choice, maintain their monopolies, and maximize dividends, as I address in chapter three. 
Before discussing the financialization of television in the 1950s and 1960s, it is first 
necessary to chart the relevant literature relating to the “audience commodity” and the 
industrial history of early television. 
Literature Review 
The Commodity Audience 
Since the 1970s, political economists have debated how to conceptualize the 
television audience, particularly considering the medium’s unique economic features. 
Network-era television was indeed distinct from other media because it was advertising-
supported, and its audiences, therefore, did not engage in direct transactions with the 




consumption require a distinct set of economic considerations—even more so than other 
forms of cultural production that, as I address throughout this thesis, already require a 
unique set of considerations due to the risky and intangible nature of production. 
In the “defining moment of political economy” (Meehan 2002, 211), Dallas 
Smythe (1977) first argued that the industrial conditions of mass media were largely 
overlooked in Western Marxism, which had instead pursued textual analysis and studied 
the dominant ideologies present in mass-media texts. Specifically, Smythe argued that 
television audiences provided media industries with “free labor” by watching 
advertisements without financial compensation and then buying advertised products. In 
other words, the television industry exploited audiences, who represented an “audience 
commodity” for advertisers and networks. Indeed, in the classical network era, viewers 
did not directly pay for the content they watched; advertisers paid networks for access to 
their audiences. Sut Jhally and Bill Livant (1986) modify Smythe’s thesis, contending 
that audience attention represented a form of labor that benefited networks, not 
advertisers; audiences did not even need to purchase the advertised products to become 
an audience commodity. Formulating an economic model to understand this relationship, 
they argued that when the advertising revenue earned by a network exceeded the 
production cost of a program, the audience’s labor was exploited for the media’s gain. 
Critics, however, note that the audience commodity theories presented by Jhally 
and Livant (1986) and Smythe (1977) overlook both audience agency and the constructed 
nature of audience ratings. Graham Murdock (1978), for example, counters that Smythe 




systems. Rick Maxwell (1991) also argues that the “site” of media labor is actually within 
the media industries, not within the process of audience consumption. Instead, audiences 
stand in for value. Eileen Meehan (1990) provides the most comprehensive reformulation 
of the audience commodity thesis. Instead of focusing on viewer activity as labor, 
Meehan shifts Smythe’s framework from Marxian debates about audience exploitation to 
considerations of how the mass audience’s demands and preferences are ignored 
altogether by the television industry. Meehan’s thesis presents the idea that networks sell 
a “commodity audience”—a small but shifting group of viewers who are most likely to 
purchase the goods advertised on television—to the advertising industry. Meehan argues 
that the only actual “markets” in the television industry are the markets that sell ratings, 
programs, and, most importantly, audiences themselves. Effectively, audiences are 
consumers of none of these markets and are instead tradable (albeit imaginary) 
commodities exchanged between networks, advertisers, and ratings companies. Goran 
Bolin (2009) points out that industry workers, such as statisticians and market 
researchers, manufacture these commodity audiences. The commodity audience, 
therefore, is not necessarily based in reality, but in a constructed reality. This political 
economy ultimately “falsifies the truism that television gives viewers what they want and 
thus reflects us and our beliefs” (Meehan 2005, 238). 
The highly constructed nature of television ratings reflected how they were 
skewed depending on the context of their production and the incentive of these entities. 
Meehan (1993) persuasively argues that audiences are not created equal in the eyes of 




represented the wealthier contingent of the U.S. economy. Thus, the audience commodity 
is/was in many ways a socio-economically discriminatory formulation created by the 
industry because it reflected the industry’s “beliefs about what sorts of people ought to be 
the audience” (Meehan 2002, 217). There are inherently class and gendered assumptions 
underlying these commodity audience exchanges. For example, advertisers “seek to 
segment audiences based on institutional sexism” (217). Even if there was no explicit 
mention of gender, Meehan argues, the commodity audience was subject to the “biases” 
inherent in capitalism. In this chapter, I contribute to Meehan’s commodity audience 
thesis by adding a fourth stakeholder to the political economy of television: Wall Street. 
Similar to how audiences are constructed, manipulated, bought, and sold in the 
transactions between advertisers, networks, and ratings companies, networks have also 
sold, pitched, and negotiated the value of their audiences to financial stakeholders. As 
capital markets and corporate diversification expanded in the post-war years, the 
commodification of the audience intensified even further. 
ABC, Hollywood, & Post-War Television  
Although it may be intuitive to study television as the natural extension of radio, 
Michael Kackman (2018) points out that, like radio, there was nothing inevitable about 
television or its dominant players. A series of cross-industrial, political, financial, and 
business developments determined the major players involved in television’s genesis. 
One of the many complex threads that affected the form of mid-century television was 
the volatile, at times impotent, involvement of Hollywood. Christopher Anderson (1994) 




the 1930s and 1940s. Most of the major studios, such as Warner Bros., pursued station 
licenses and tried to build their own networks as early as the 1920s. Paramount, for one, 
even owned radio station licenses and successfully built its own regional network on the 
west coast (23). 
However, the FCC’s licensing freeze in the late 1940s and its various antitrust 
rules ensured Hollywood would remain outside of television ownership until the 1980s 
and that the top two networks would remain in power. William Boddy (1993) argues that 
the FCC’s license freeze between 1948 and 1952 allowed CBS and NBC to solidify their 
positions as the top two networks in the U.S., keeping out studios and other fledgling 
networks (51–53). Similarly, Boddy notes how the technical scarcity of VHF (Very High 
Frequency) channels provided CBS and NBC with a leg up over DuMont and ABC, 
which were frequently saddled with lower-quality UHF (Ultra High Frequency) channels 
(53). Due to these structural limitations, ABC’s competitive position in the 1940s and 
1950s was weaker relative to CBS and NBC.  
To compete with the Big Two, ABC would, therefore, need a significant amount 
of capital and financial support to build out its stations, improve programming, and, as 
this chapter suggests, legitimate itself to Wall Street. This strategy was largely successful. 
Boddy (1993) concludes that ABC would become a legitimate competitor to NBC and 
CBS by the late 1950s when it began offering Hollywood telefilm programming to 
audiences, primarily younger viewers, who were ignored by the other networks (148).21 
 
21 Baughman (1990) argues that ABC led the charge in bringing Hollywood production standards to 
television. He rightly points out the irony of this development: ABC’s very formation was the result of 




In the process of differentiating its programs and attracting younger audiences, ABC 
would bring legacy Hollywood back into the television business. At first, in the 1940s 
and early 1950s, the studios were hesitant to provide networks with programming 
because their audiences and advertising revenue were not large enough to justify the high 
costs of “Hollywood production values” (Anderson 1994, 22). However, this would 
change in the late 1950s, as television’s market penetration increased and the networks 
shifted from single-sponsor programming to magazine/multiple-sponsor models—the 
latter of which would fully take hold by the early 1960s. 
This shift in advertising was not merely a matter of when commercial messages 
were scheduled. Cynthia Meyers (2009) outlines how the 1950s also marked a transition 
in the ownership of programming; the networks—rather than advertisers—became 
program producers, schedulers, and (at least partial) owners of prime-time content and its 
downstream revenues (72). This was important because networks could now control their 
schedules and, therefore, target the largest possible audience to increase advertising rates 
(74). This development was important to the commodity audience theory because, as 
Meyers points out, “advertisers no longer had to look for a program to fit the commercial 
message; advertisers and their agencies looked for audiences” (74). Thus, the market for 
commodity audiences emerged, and ratings became the yardsticks by which networks 
proved their value to both advertisers and financial markets. Altogether, the scholars who 
study this period (Boddy; Baughman; Anderson; Meyers) do not address the 
 
but it was ABC that would ensure the involvement of legacy Hollywood in television production in 




consequences of ABC’s leveraged position in the 1960s and the increasing power of 
financial capital in the television industry. 
The Financialization of ABC & the Financial Commodity Audience 
Risky Business: Television Stocks Before 1960 
Despite the solidification of network dominance, as well as the growth of 
television set sales and national audiences, institutional investors still “wanted nothing to 
do with” the broadcasting industry throughout the 1950s (Gelman 1964a, 3). In fact, at 
the start of the decade, there were only a handful of publicly-traded broadcasting 
stocks—31 in 1952—the majority of which were station groups (3). Similar to RCA’s 
risky financial position in the early 1900s, the market was generally averse to stocks that 
had few “brick and mortar” assets relative to total revenue; this once again represented 
the uncertainty of cultural industry production in the eyes of investors (4). Many 
investors believed that television stocks, particularly network stocks, would always be 
volatile and speculative because, as “show business” equities that did not operate under 
the same economic logic as tangible consumer products, they required too much special 
attention from investors (42). 
In addition to the lack of brick-and-mortar assets, there were also a number of 
regulatory concerns that made Wall Street somewhat ambivalent toward radio and 
television stocks—and, vice versa, these factors made radio and television companies 
ambivalent about going public in the first place.22 In addition to the increased scrutiny 
 
22 It is worth noting that the amount of stock actually held by the public typically, at that time, only 




that all public companies experienced under the watchful eye of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), broadcasters also needed to deal with the FCC. From the 
New Deal era through the 1960s, traders of broadcasting stock experienced an additional 
level of federal oversight from the SEC and FCC (Gelman 1964a, 42). Many traders 
worried that the FCC would tighten ownership limitations, perhaps reducing the 
maximum number of stations that a single company could own; at the time, a single 
entity could not exceed 1% ownership in more than seven stations (42). Also, 
broadcasters and media moguls were concerned that corporate raiders would turn their 
company over to new majority owner(s), who could then strip the company of its assets 
and/or pursue erratic corporate strategies (42). 
On a discursive level, television and advertising stocks continued to have a “racy 
connotation” throughout the 1950s (42). By the 1960s, investors would have certainly 
remembered Newton Minow’s infamous “vast wasteland” speech that associated 
television with low culture and suggested that the medium was a problem that needed to 
be fixed. Unlike other art forms, television’s discursive positioning as a “low” cultural 
medium bled into its financial valuation. Notably, this sentiment pointed to the fact that 
bankers and traders relied on the social and discursive aspects of their business to inform 
decision making, just as much as, if not more so than, rational accounting practices and 
profit results. The internal industry's desire to overcome this “racy” connotation would 
drive executives to (try to) legitimate their industry to Wall Street by instituting various 
 
employees, executives, and board members (Gelman 1964a, 32). This would change, however, as 




financialized strategies, including initial public offerings (IPOs). 
Financialized History of ABC under Edward Noble, 1943–1951 
The early financial history of ABC under private ownership highlights an 
inescapable cycle of debt and the network’s non-legitimated status as a poorly performing 
network. In 1943, the FCC had approved the sale of NBC Blue to the “candy tycoon” 
Edward J. Noble, who then became 100% owner and the new chairman and CEO of what 
would subsequently be renamed the American Broadcasting Company (ABC).23 Despite 
his managerial and allocative control over ABC, Noble would accumulate unsustainable 
levels of debt during his decade-long tenure at the helm. Even upon acquiring the 
company, Noble was vulnerable to financial influence. Although Noble bought the 
company outright for $8 million, he borrowed half of that sum from three financial 
institutions: Commercial Bank and Trust, Bankers Trust Company, and the Central 
Hanover Bank and Trust Company (New York Times 1943). Additionally, because ABC 
only had three owned and operated (“O&O”) stations at the time of its sale, Noble would 
need more capital to build out and sustain the operations of new O&Os.24 Later, in order 
to quickly launch ABC Television, which first broadcast on April 19, 1948, Noble 
borrowed his final line of credit: $5 million from the Prudential Insurance Company of 
America (Gomery and Howell 2004, 57). Thereafter, banks were unwilling to extend his 
line of credit any further to fund programming (Goldenson and Wolf 1991, 99). Noble’s 
 
23 Once again typifying the blurred boundaries between the state and private enterprise was the fact 
that Noble was a former federal official under the Secretary of Commerce (New York Times 1943). 
24 By the early 1950s, Noble was largely successful in these efforts; he had built out five stations and 




preference for liabilities over equity was seemingly ABC’s only option at the time, 
considering the poor speculative potential of broadcasting stocks in the 1950s and ABC’s 
third-place position. Once commercial banks refused to loan him more money, and stock 
issuances proved unsuccessful, Noble went into his own pocket to bankroll ABC’s day-
to-day operations. This position left ABC vulnerable to bankruptcy or a potential 
takeover by a larger company. Still, this preference for debt allowed Noble to maintain a 
majority ownership in ABC throughout his reign. Even at the time of its sale to United 
Paramount Theatres (UPT), Noble owned 58% of ABC (Goldenson and Wolf 1991, 110).  
Despite these loans and the potential soft power wielded by the financial industry 
over ABC, Noble’s board was not particularly financialized, particularly in comparison to 
RCA’s board (detailed in chapter one)—perhaps because ABC was not particularly 
attractive in terms of financial extraction. Even prior to its merger with UPT in 1953, 
ABC’s board represented a balance of internal executives, legal representation, political 
influences/lobbyists, and those representing external industries (Annual Report 1952, 8). 
There was only one indirect Wall Street influence on the board at the time: Alger B. 
Chapman. Although a Life Savers executive whom Noble would have been amicable 
with, Chapman was also on the board of the Bowery Savings Bank and the Bank of New 
York (Saxon 1983), which suggests there was at least the potential that Wall Street could 
have exerted some allocative control over ABC. Furthermore, the leveraged position of 
Noble’s initial purchase of ABC almost certainly suggests that his lenders would have 
held some influence over ABC’s decision making and financial strategy; though, there is 




On the verge of bankruptcy in 1951, Noble had almost no option but to sell to an 
outside buyer in the hopes of recouping his investment. According to Goldenson, Noble 
was “desperate to sell” (Goldenson and Wolf 1991, 99). UPT—the theater chain formerly 
owned by Paramount Pictures—and its board agreed to pay a record-breaking $25 million 
for ABC and its assets, which included twelve radio stations and five television stations 
(Gomery and Howell 2004, 57). Considering the negative perception of broadcasting 
stocks at the time and the amount of debt Noble had racked up, Wall Street had strongly 
advised against acquiring ABC (Baughman 1990, 107).25 Structurally, however, the 
acquisition represented a fundamental shift in the political economy of corporate media: 
from organizations operated and owned by “moguls” like Noble to diversified 
conglomerates owned by multiple stakeholders and managed by figure-heads like 
Goldenson, who maintained only a small ownership percentage in the company. 
Financialized History of AB-PT, 1950s 
Under the watch of Goldenson, ABC and its new parent company would become 
further financialized and legitimated in the eyes of Wall Street, though still less so than 
the other networks. First, the early composition of UPT and AB-PT’s board demonstrated 
its financialized state. The Paramount Decrees previously required that UPT maintain at 
least four non-Paramount directors on its board, so just before the acquisition, three board 
members were UPT executives, while the other four included a partner at a brokerage 
firm, the head of Western Union, the president of First National Bank, and the president 
 
25 However, this would prove to be poor advice. Douglas Gomery and Chuck Howell (2004) 
succinctly summarizes that Goldenson would go on to create the template for “a modern media 




of a manufacturing company (Goldenson and Wolf 1991, 103–104). Considering the 
relatively small size of the board, the two Wall Street board members were significant. 
Also, Wall Street’s aversion to broadcasting stocks seemingly accounts for the board’s 
initial skepticism toward the deal. Specifically, the board was concerned that ABC would 
not be able to compete with NBC and CBS because it had no stars and would burn 
through UPT’s cash (104, 106). To vet ABC, UPT’s board even met with Harry Hagerty, 
the Vice Chairman of Metropolitan Life Insurance who had lent money to ABC, to get 
his opinion on the deal (106).26 This behind-closed-doors meeting reflected the implicit 
power that certain financial stakeholders maintained on Wall Street. Eventually, 
Goldenson convinced the skeptical outside board members and Hagerty that he would use 
his Hollywood connections to “improve” ABC content (104). He promised Hagerty and 
his board that he would shift from live programming to non-live Hollywood telefilm 
production, suggesting that Goldenson’s strategy for ABC in the 1950s was, at least 
partially, driven by this initial commitment to his board. More broadly, it also reflects 
UPT’s desire to legitimate ABC and the broadcasting industry as a whole, both of which 
still remained relatively unattractive to investors. 
Already a publicly-traded and financialized institution, Goldenson would further 
solidify ABC’s reliance on banks for credit. Just three years after the ABC acquisition, in 
1956, Goldenson secured a loan from Metropolitan Insurance and five other banks to 
funnel money into Hollywood-produced series (Baughman 1990, 106–107). The loan 
 
26  Whatever Hagerty told the board seemed to be enough, as they approved the deal shortly thereafter 




consisted of $37.2 million to pay down ABC’s old debts and only $27 million in new 
credit for increasing Hollywood production costs—this dynamic of borrowing to pay off 
old debts only perpetuated AB-PT’s constant need to turn to financial institutions for 
capital and growth (107).27  
AB-PT’s Programming Strategy, 1950s 
Considering the soft power wielded by Wall Street stakeholders and Goldenson’s 
initial promise to his board, it is worth examining how financialization may have 
influenced ABC’s programming strategies during this period. Goldenson believed that 
the only way for the network to succeed was to “counterprogram” against NBC and CBS 
(Anderson 1994, 140–141). Instead of broadcasting “spectaculars” and isolated live 
programs, ABC instituted two fundamental changes to its programming: shifting from 
live to pre-recorded series and turning to Hollywood for prime-time content (140).28 
These strategies were not simply driven by ABC’s desire to legitimate itself to Wall 
Street or to increase viewership. Goldenson also sought to improve “clearance rates”: the 
percentage of network programs that affiliates “accepted” and aired on their stations. At 
the time of the UPT acquisition, ABC had a clearance rate of 34% and only 14 primary 
affiliates, whereas NBC and CBS had 64 and 30 primary affiliates, respectively 
(Anderson 1994, 138). Goldenson believed that Hollywood could improve ABC’s 
clearance rates and low ratings. According to Christopher Anderson (1994), “Hollywood 
 
27 AB-PT also sold several of its theater holdings to bankroll ABC’s increasing production costs, 
which represented AB-PT transition from just a film exhibition company to a more diversified 
conglomerate (Baughman 1990, 106). 
28 Ironically, Goldenson had just told the FCC during AB-PT merger hearings that he would value live 
broadcasts over filmed content (a dynamic preferred by the FCC in the name of public interest) 




production values” would differentiate the third-place network from the low production 
values of live content on CBS and NBC (41). Hollywood genres like westerns and 
detective series, Goldenson argued, would also appeal to younger audiences who were 
“dissatisfied with radio-style fare” (41).29 Although this was a complex decision driven 
by several economic and cultural factors, the turn to Hollywood was at least partially 
driven by Goldenson’s promise to Wall Street. Indeed, underwriters of AB-PT’s stock 
insisted on filmed series because, according to their logic, filmed content was less risky 
than live content, cost less to produce, and offered the potential of downstream 
syndication revenue (Baughman 1990, 110). 
By the mid-1950s, ABC had formed close partnerships with Hollywood studios 
and independent production companies, most prominently with Disney and Warner Bros. 
Counterprogramming against the popular CBS variety show Arthur Godfrey and His 
Friends (1949–1959), for example, ABC broadcast its first series from Disney 
(Disneyland) in 1954. ABC cited research that younger viewers were seeking alternatives 
to Arthur Godfrey, a show that already skewed older (Baughman 1990, 98). Although a 
gamble for ABC and a program that was passed on by NBC and CBS, Disneyland 
quickly became a top ten rated program (in the 1954-1955 and 1955-1956 seasons) and 
accounted for half of ABC’s advertising revenue in 1954 (Anderson 1994, 141). ABC 
subsequently added two additional Disney programs: a three-part Davy Crockett 
 
29 This shift away from legacy radio formats signaled that the AB-PT of the 1950s was a far cry from 
Edward Noble’s ABC, where radio shows “converted to television reward the audience, the network 





“miniseries” and the even younger-skewing The Mickey Mouse Club (Baughman 1990, 
98–99). This increase in ratings did not go unnoticed by Wall Street. AB-PT’s stock 
experienced the first bump in its stock price during the 1954-1955 season (Table 1). 
Although at first hostile to television and averse to television content, Warner Bros. also 
eventually signed an agreement with ABC in 1955 to produce a collection of programs 
(Baughman 1990, 101).30 In addition to these Disney programs, ABC also started to air 
western programs and, subsequently, detective series.31    
 Despite all these strategic changes and the minor bump in its stock price in the 
mid-1950s, AB-PT still struggled to legitimate itself on Wall Street, and its stock 
remained low relative to NBC (i.e., RCA) and CBS’s stock. As Baughman (1990) points 
out, investors concluded that AB-PT stock was not an attractive investment even as late 
as 1958, when ABC touted five top 30 primetime programs—its best up to that point 
(Table 1). Even the Warner Bros. and Disney deals failed to “warm bankers to the third 
network” (107). In fact, UPT stock before the ABC acquisition was $1.70 per share, but 
by 1958, AB-PT stock had fallen to $1.21 per share (107). This failure to warm up Wall 
Street was, in part, due to the low cultural status of programs like westerns and detective 
series, versus the high-cultural status of adult programs on NBC and CBS. These genre 
programs—mostly from Warner Bros.—initially provided low ratings and worse critical   
 
30 By 1959, Warner Brothers produced approximately one third of ABC’s programming (Baughman 
1990, 104). 
31 According to Baughman (1990), ABC “re-popularized” the western and the detective genres. 
ABC’s westerns, for example, were different from other westerns that were programmed earlier in the 
day; ABC scheduled them in prime time, thus appealing to both children and parents (103). By the 
second half of the 1950s, ABC added more detective programs to its rotation, including the popular 77 
Sunset Strip (103). Like the heroes in western serials, the lead detectives in these shows were 









reviews (Baughman 1990, 101–102). Altogether, the network’s turn away from 
“prestige” programs (i.e., musical specials, variety shows, and anthologies) and toward 
genre programming was received poorly on Wall Street (Kroeger 1961, 62). Given Wall 
Street’s general aversion to disruptions in the status quo, traders and banks perceived all 
these programming changes as a risk and, therefore, AB-PT’s stock remained suppressed 
throughout the 1950s. Still, ABC’s shift away from “brand image,” advertiser-sponsored 
content to series supported by “magazine-style” advertising allowed AB-PT to attract a 
Table 1: The relationship between AB-PT’s annual high/low stock prices and ABC’s Nielsen 
rating performance. 
Sources: Barron’s 1958; Barron’s 1962; Broadcasting 1969, 40; Broadcasting 1970, 46; Brooks 




larger and younger audience and take more control over its content. 
In summary, ABC and Goldenson went to great lengths to please Wall Street in 
the 1950s, but they failed to successfully change the hearts and minds of risk-averse 
traders who preferred station group stocks over volatile network stocks and prestige 
programming over youth-oriented telefilm series. Although this chapter largely takes the 
position that financialization was an important factor in determining the structure of the 
television industry in its first three decades, ABC’s turn away from prestige sponsorship 
programming to Hollywood-produced programs and its disregard of financial analysts 
certainly disrupts the deterministic perspective that financialization was all-
encompassing. Still, the very fact that AB-PT’s stock price remained low during this 
transition in the mid-to-late 1950s demonstrates a correlation between stock prices and 
programming/ratings. As noted below, once more ABC programs entered the top 30 and 
the broadcasting sector was perceived as less risky, AB-PT’s stock price responded 
accordingly.32 
Wall Street Legitimation & the Perils of Going Public, Early 1960s 
After a tumultuous financial period in the 1950s, broadcasting stocks started to 
become legitimated in the eyes of Wall Street around 1961, when enough broadcasting 
stocks proved stable enough to warrant investment. At this point, bankers finally 
acknowledged that broadcasting had become a “big business” and “matured” (Gelman 
1964a, 4). By the mid-1960s, television trade magazines encouraged broadcasters to go 
 
32 The only aberration from this rating/stock price correlation is in 1967, when talks of an ITT/AB-PT 




public. Despite the drawbacks of going public (noted earlier), Television magazine 
advised that broadcast companies go public for the same reasons that any company 
should (32). First, it provides a way for the market to “assess the value” of a company 
beyond just its balance sheets (i.e., its revenues, expenses, profitability, etc.) and for the 
company to, as a result, more easily access credit (32). Second, executives believed that 
this allowed their company to operate at a “speculative value,” rather than a book value 
(32). In other words, executives could manufacture the value of their company and stock 
price through speculation and discourse, rather than through material change or 
profitability. This put more power in the hands of upper-level executives and board 
members (rather than managers). Third, an Initial Public Offering (IPO) signaled to the 
financial world that the “status” of a company, and by extension an industry, was 
legitimate and stable (38). Finally, on a practical level, going public provided companies 
with more opportunities to take advantage of tax loopholes (32). These four rationales 
embodied the increasingly financialized state of broadcasting in the mid-1960s, as more 
networks and station groups went public and ceded more of their stock to public 
investors, rather than private owners or employees. Altogether, being publicly traded 
meant that broadcasters cared how Wall Street perceived them; therefore, banks and 
financial institutions did not need board seats or even substantial ownership holdings to 
exert control. Power was indirect and implicit. Effectively, this dynamic of going public 
in order to qualify for credit also resulted in a self-perpetuating cycle of financialization. 
Although going public provided executives with more discursive power to control 




broadcasters to prove their value to the investment banks that would “underwrite” stock 
issuances. Before going public, a company—broadcaster, station group, or otherwise—
needed to find an “underwriter” interested in their business and recognize its “growth 
potential” (Gelman 1964a, 36). As “the wholesaler” of the stock and middleman who 
would bring a company’s stock to the public market, the underwriter (i.e., the investment 
bank) needed to be able to identify signs of growth in a broadcasting company because 
that underwriter was legally obligated to purchase the shares not acquired by the public 
(36). Considering this dynamic, when a broadcasting group or network courted an 
investment bank before an IPO or any subsequent stock issuance, it may have catered its 
products and services to align with the values and ideologies of Wall Street. In the case of 
radio, television, and other cultural industry stocks, this resulted in target audience 
constructions and programming that banks and analysts were amenable to—a dynamic 
reflected in Wall Street’s preference for “prestige” programming over westerns. Even if a 
network’s desire to please Wall Street only resulted in a change in discourse (in its 
conversations with financial stakeholders), rather than a material change in audience, it 
still led to an exchange: audiences were commodified as products via ratings and sold 
(indirectly) to Wall Street for a price (i.e., a stock price). 
More than just equity financing and stock prices, debt financing offered Wall 
Street a way to influence allocative decisions. However, after a rebuilding period from 
1953 to 1960, ABC decreased its reliance on debt financing. AB-PT also removed two 
Wall Street influences from its board in 1960 (Broadcasting 1960, B-12). Therefore, 




simply looking at board composition does not account for the implicit power wielded by 
stock traders and banks. Moreover, just because AB-PT’s board of directors was diverse 
and included individuals from various industrial backgrounds does not necessarily mean 
that the board served a diversity of interests. As David Hesmondhalgh (2013) points out, 
this conclusion “misses the point. It is not the interests of particular individuals that are at 
stake but the interests of the social class to which they tend to belong — wealthy and 
powerful owners of capital with strong ties to other powerful and influential institutions 
and individuals” (75).  
Just four years later, in 1964, ABC would once again turn to Wall Street for debt 
financing. In addition to negotiating expensive licensing deals for Hollywood content, 
ABC had to contend with the high costs of converting to color.33 Advertisers preferred 
color programming for their products, but ABC could not financially make the switch 
yet, nor could it afford color studio films (Goldenson and Wolf 1991, 251). Once again, 
Goldenson and ABC turned to outside capital to fund the conversion. Additionally, as the 
market matured, ABC became vulnerable to institutional and activist investors, just like 
the rest of the broadcasting industry. For example, 20% of ABC’s stock was in the hands 
of mutual funds in 1964. Moreover, the activist investor Norton Simon tried and failed to 
take control of the company through a hostile takeover in the early 1960s; though, 
Goldenson was able to keep Simon at bay through clever corporate maneuvering 
(Gelman 1964b, 60). Altogether, under AB-PT, ABC had become a “mature” company 
 





according to the market and was, therefore, subject to the complexities of Wall Street 
speculation, on top of the potential influence of those it owed money to. 
The Sleeping Giants: Institutional Investors 
As the broadcasting industry became discursively legitimated on Wall Street, 
institutional investors, which at the time only really included mutual funds and pension 
funds, began funneling cash into station groups, advertising agencies, and network 
stocks. By the mid-1960s, 30% of broadcasting stocks were in the hands of institutional 
investors (Gelman 1964a, 4); this was a notable shift from just a few years earlier when 
moguls like Edward Noble owned over 75% of ABC. Among the three largest mutual 
funds at the time, there was a web of cross-ownership that should have raised flags with 
the FCC. In 1961, Fidelity Trend Fund, for example, held an ownership interest in excess 
of 1% in more than 90 broadcasting stations, putting Fidelity in violation of the FCC’s 
institutional ownership limitation. Similarly, United Funds and Keystone Funds each 
owned more than 1% of a whopping 51 stations (Gelman 1964b, 58). Despite the 
financial monopoly that undergirded publicly-traded station groups, financial analysts at 
the time were not concerned because they assumed the FCC would take a “collaborative 
approach” to ownership; they concluded that state intervention, on the other hand, would 
get too messy and disrupt the market because so many large investors owned stations 
(58). 
Despite these clear examples of institutional financialization in the television 
industry, many executives went to great lengths to create the appearance that they were 




rarely held meetings with institutional investors more than twice per year—and this was 
frequently after these investors had already purchased the company’s stock (Gelman 
1964a, 58). Others claimed that they rarely or never talked to mutual funds (58). One 
broadcasting executive concluded, “As long as these mutual funds are stockholders and 
not controlling boards of directors, we’re not violating anything” (58). However, these 
responses are patently false. Media companies generally wanted to create a positive 
image with Wall Street, so they often had private meetings with shareholders. Despite 
claims that networks rarely met with banks or financial analysts (Gelman 1964b, 58), 
corporations often had private face-to-face conversations with Wall Street. In late 1961, 
for example, CBS and Metromedia, a station group, launched a series of “educational 
campaigns” to inform traders and bankers about the idiosyncrasies of broadcasting (40). 
These companies held over five meetings per week with analysts and researchers, 
according to one insider, in an effort to manufacture a positive image on the Street (40).  
Additionally, these claims that broadcasting was free from financial control 
ignore the soft power of institutional investors. Common ownership in multiple entities 
within the same industry, even by investors considered “passive,” leads to 
anticompetitive outcomes, increased prices, and other hidden social costs (Azar, Schmalz, 
and Tecu 2018). This occurs even if institutional investors are not actively trying to enact 
such outcomes, as these processes are ambivalent and natural to capitalism (Posner, 
Morton, and Weyl 2017). As Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018) conclude, “it is important 
to recognize that common owners of competitors need not explicitly communicate their 





Although implicit financial power certainly existed, the FCC still earnestly tried 
to reign in ownership abuses—as long as such measures did not substantively disrupt 
private enterprise. In the late 1950s, for example, the FCC had contextually imposed 
restrictions on certain broadcasting ownership structures, ensuring that investors with 
cross-holdings in more than seven stations would only be able to hold non-voting stock in 
those station groups (Gelman 1964b, 57).34 Even though this rule limited investors’ 
allocative power over the board of director nominations, they would still have been 
important to broadcasters that wanted to keep up the demand for their stock and ensure 
capital inflows via debt financing and equity issuances. Therefore, this ownership cap did 
not account for the implicit influence mutual funds like Keystone or Fidelity could exert 
simply by owning a large quantity of the stock. Moreover, by 1968, the FCC relaxed its 
restrictions on ownership even further, increasing the maximum percentage investment 
stake to 3% and allowing mutual funds to hold as much voting stock as they wanted as 
long as they remained below the 3% threshold (New York Times 1968). Even though the 
FCC’s initial ownership limitations addressed the problems of “under the hood” 
ownership concentration, these rules started to slip away in the 1960s, when the FCC 
directed its scrutiny to other areas of antitrust concern (i.e., mergers and acquisitions).  
Due to concentrated institutional ownership and institutional investors’ preference 
for risk minimization, media companies started to diversify their assets in the 1950s and 
 
34 Holders of non-voting stock are not allowed to vote on allocative measures like board seats or other 




1960s. Increasingly, corporations invested in smaller companies that conducted business 
in somewhat complementary industries or new industries altogether.35 Of the 100 largest 
companies in the United States in 1939, 77 focused 70% or more of their business on just 
one industry; however, by 1979, only 23 of the 100 largest corporations concentrated 
their business on a single industry (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 72). This trend was no different 
in broadcasting. After going public, “most broadcasting companies … eyed 
diversification” because they wanted to prove to investors that they cared about growth 
and were “not happy with a lump sum of profit every quarter” (Gelman 1964b, 53). Even 
as early as the 1960s, industry insiders identified a correlation between acquisitions and 
an increase in a broadcaster’s stock price (Television 1965, 12). 
As a single entity was limited to owning seven television stations, networks and 
station groups looked elsewhere to demonstrate growth and upside to investors. By the 
early 1960s, for example, some companies began investing in CATV—what would 
eventually become cable television. Others, including AB-PT, invested in seemingly 
unrelated industries like plastics, manufacturing, and satellite technologies (New York 
Times 1956). Goldenson claimed that he wanted to diversify ABC beyond just 
broadcasting and theater holdings, proclaiming to shareholders in 1961 that AB-PT was 
“an investment company” (Kroeger 1961, 62).36 For example, AB-PT had invested in 
Wind Tunnel Instruments Company and Microwave Associates in 1956 (New York Times 
 
35 Broadcasting companies rarely diversified into other entertainment segments because these holdings 
would only beget more risk. In most cases, this meant that companies were not horizontally or 
vertically integrating, but investing in cross-industry holdings that, effectively, operated as separate 
entities (Gelman 1964b, 53). 
36 By 1961, once AB-PT had demonstrated diversification, financial analysts finally deemed AB-PT a 




1956). Although Wind Tunnel primarily serviced military and airline contracts at the 
time, AB-PT concluded that it complemented AB-PT’s “engineering capabilities,” and it 
could transform these services into commercial offerings (New York Times 1956). 
Even if it was not in the best interest of the parent company’s core business to 
diversify, executives were often willing to cannibalize their core business if it meant the 
larger conglomerate could create the perception of financial growth. This dynamic 
embodies Meehan’s (1986) conception of “structuralism,” whereby industries grind or 
mesh together at the expense of particular organizations, segments within those 
industries, or the industry as a whole (401). Indeed, diversification in media industries 
operates at the expense of media segments. Dan Shaver and Mary Alice Shaver (2005) 
conclude that, compared to non-diversified media companies, diversified conglomerates 
are far less likely to reinvest their profits back into their media segments; they instead 
transfer excess capital to dividends or other non-media segments of the company’s 
portfolio (55–57).37 In other words, “owners of media accept that owners must make 
negative financial decisions for greater public obligation” (47).  
Despite the industry’s desire to please investors, as demonstrated by increasing 
diversification and the number of IPOs in broadcasting in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the relationship between Wall Street and broadcasters was hardly amicable. Indeed, 
broadcasting stakeholders were frustrated that Wall Street held so much power over the 
 
37 It is worth noting that in the 1960s tax policy incentivized broadcasting companies to reinvest 
profits back into their company by hiding gains as costs, rather than providing dividends to 
shareholders or stating profits outright, as they were concerned that taxes might be too high (Gelman 
1964b, 53). This would change with neoliberal policies in the 1970s that incentivized shareholder 




growth of the industry and its access to capital, even after the broadcasting industry had 
legitimated itself to the financial establishment. The matter was a frequent topic within 
the industry and its trade magazines. One edition of Television concluded, “Most of the 
financial boys on Wall Street are tough customers to impress” (Television 1964a, 7A). In 
a subsequent letter to the editor of Television magazine, a reader upset about market 
speculation and its effect on broadcasting argued that the “Wall Street ‘herd’ [should] 
keep their ‘speculation’ to themselves and recognize their place as order takers for the 
‘smart money’” (Television 1964b, 30). The reader was frustrated that Wall Street 
believed it was the reason why the broadcasting industry had succeeded financially—
rather than recognizing that broadcasting’s growth was brought about by a host of 
laborers, engineers, and business strategists at the local and national level. 
Overall, this somewhat snarky dynamic reflected the social processes of 
negotiation and resistance within and between these two industries (finance and 
television). In other words, the developments within broadcasting were hardly the result 
of predetermined economic structures, nor did one industry have absolute power over the 
other. Certainly, it is valuable in our understanding of the financialization of media to 
recognize these examples of “instrumentalism” (Meehan 1986, 397) that reflect the 
agency of individual stakeholders who act on behalf of companies and prove “business 
operations” are hardly monolithic or uniform processes. All of these trends—the rise in 
institutional ownership, IPOs, “educational” meetings with financial analysts, corporate 
diversification, financial legitimation, and industry contestation—contextualize the 




oft-overlooked commodity audience formation. 
Analysis: The Financialized Commodity Audience 
In this final section, in a prelude to chapter three, I theorize how ABC’s 
presentation of its audiences represented a new commodity audience formation that has 
been overlooked in commodity audience literature. In their financial reports to 
shareholders and in informal discussions with Wall Street, ABC and its executives 
implicitly commodified their audiences in an effort to financially legitimize the network 
and, by extension, the broadcasting industry as a whole. As this was operating on a 
discursive level, rather than a material level, the evidence presented in this section does 
not always necessarily reflect actual audience measurement. 
Under Edward Noble, in the wave of post-war patriotism, the very name the 
American Broadcasting Company represented a commodity audience that was based on a 
unified national interest. Indeed, in Noble’s address to shareholders in 1945, he referred 
to his audiences as “citizens” and claimed that ABC had the opportunity to “lead the 
world through peace” (Report on 1945 1946, 4). Thereafter, the report focused primarily 
on network affiliates and O&Os, rather than audiences. Noble’s focus on O&Os and 
affiliates points to his recognition that shareholders valued stations and tangible assets 
more than brand value. In his final letter to shareholders seven years later in 1952, Noble 
made no mention of audiences at all; he instead focused on ABC’s owned and operated 
stations and their strategic advantage, once again demonstrating that the “brick and 
mortar” assets of ABC were the best way to demonstrate the network’s stability to 




need to concern itself with shareholders because he was the majority owner and rarely 
successfully raised capital through equity issuances. Accordingly, Noble’s goal was not 
to create the perception of growth, which would have been necessary if he needed to 
issue more stock and/or court an underwriter, but the perception of stability, which Noble 
would have needed to ensure his stock did not drop precipitously. 
With the resurgence of consumerism in post-war America, however, this 
“audience as citizen” disposition would become the “audience as consumer.” When the 
network came under the control of the increasingly diversified AB-PT, ABC no longer 
tried to convey its value via its physical assets. Instead, ABC executives pushed the 
discursive value of ABC’s audiences. As noted earlier, this strategy was consistent with 
that of other publicly traded companies that manufactured value through discourse, rather 
than just through balance sheet results; and no concept was more discursively malleable 
in the television industry than “the audience.” As AB-PT relied heavily on stock 
issuances for capital, Goldenson would have needed to create the perception of growth, 
not just stability. Overall, ABC under AB-PT wanted to both appease Wall Street and 
increase its revenue—which were not always complementary goals. In order to do so, the 
network simultaneously tried to emphasize its “mass” audience and differentiate itself 
from CBS, DuMont, and NBC by touting its “youth” audience—a task that required a 
discursive balancing act between massification and nichification. On the one hand, 
targeting younger audiences and counterprogramming against “prestige” live content 
could lead to higher ratings and more revenue. On the other hand, targeting younger 




Wall Street found distasteful and disruptive of the status quo. 
Even a nascent AB-PT in 1955 touted that ABC catered “to all tastes” and 
attracted family audiences (Annual Report 1955, 15). Its 1955 report detailed how the 
Disney-produced Mickey Mouse Club was not only the highest-rated show for children 
but was also able to attract women in the daytime slot (18). While still vague, this 
discussion of gender and age demographics represented a slight shift from the broadness 
of “lowest common denominator” fare. Indeed, ABC wanted to strategically target 
“youthful families with children”— an increasingly large share of the public after WWII 
(Anderson 1994, 140). Goldenson problematically summarized that ABC wanted to lure 
“the young housewife—one cut above the teenager—with two to four kids, who has to 
buy the clothing, the food, the soaps, the home remedies” (140). This allowed ABC to 
bring in revenue through the “small ticket” advertising that was increasingly dominating 
the magazine style of advertising. This strategy was certainly not new. Meehan (2002) 
notes how “the category of gender was an industrial concern for the rating monopolist, 
advertisers, and broadcasters from at least 1929” (216). Meehan cites that NBC first 
encouraged Nielsen to shift its demographic sample to younger viewers in the early 
1960s, with ABC eventually joining the campaign shortly thereafter (213–214). Although 
Meehan credits NBC with this shift, ABC’s programming strategies between the mid-
1950s and the late 1960s suggest that it had at least started this trend, when it targeted 
younger viewers with Disney content. 
Wall Street was hardly ambivalent toward these programming changes. For 




musical series featuring opera and classical music, investors were nonplussed (Kroeger 
1961, 62). Seemingly, the program connoted “prestige” to investors because of its 
association with classical music (and its “high” cultural status) and reflected the type of 
discursive legitimation that Wall Street sought in broadcasting stocks—particularly in the 
absence of physical assets. In response to Wall Street, however, Goldenson claimed that 
the viewers of Voice of Firestone were too old and “weren’t the audience we want 
anyway” (Kroeger 1961, 62). Instead, ABC wanted to attract “bigger younger audiences” 
(62). Clearly, despite its claims of “television for everyone,” the network was not 
interested in attracting older viewers—a fact that Wall Street was well attuned to. Even in 
late 1963, when ABC had grown its audience and its network operations were finally 
profitable, brokerages still advised against purchasing ABC’s stock (Baughman 1990, 
107). Altogether, ABC’s shift from anthologies and variety programs that connoted 
prestige to family programming demonstrated that ABC was willing to sidestep the 
whims of Wall Street, at least temporarily, in order to create a unique brand identity.  
However, this digression does not discredit the “financialized commodity 
audience” thesis. On the contrary, it empowers this hypothesis because it demonstrates 
that there was a correlative perceived value, however imprecise and discursive, that Wall 
Street placed on ABC’s audience and its ratings. The indirect commodification of this 
audience operated via AB-PT’s stock price (Tables 1 and 2). Indeed, it was not until ABC 
had ten prime time programs in the top 30 and four in the top 10 in the 1964-1965 season 
that its stock price rose significantly. For the most part, this financialized commodity 




1950s and early 1960s, when the network tried to establish itself as a true competitor 






Even outside of trade articles and financial statements, ABC’s exchanges with the 
FCC and Department of Justice (DOJ) betrayed the importance of the financialized 
commodity audience. For example, the network’s attempted merger with International 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) revealed the network’s increased reliance on 
Table 2: Correlation between ABC’s annual low stock price and the number of ABC programs in 
the Nielsen Top 10 for prime time programming. 
Sources: Barron’s 1958; Barron’s 1962; Broadcasting 1969, 40; Broadcasting 1970, 46; Brooks and 





finance capital and the role of audience ratings in determining stock prices. In 1967, the 
DOJ and the FCC stalled AB-PT’s attempt to merge with ITT. Regulators were 
concerned that ITT’s ownership, as a diversified corporation with many non-U.S. 
holdings, would have softened ABC News’ coverage of events that occurred in the non-
U.S. countries where ITT operated. The FCC also concluded that AB-PT failed to 
demonstrate how the public interest would be served by the acquisition. Goldenson and 
his legal team instead relied solely on the financial benefits of the deal to justify its 
approval. They claimed that the merger was necessary because ABC (1) required an 
infusion of capital to help convert ABC’s facilities to color and (2) needed to diversify its 
assets “so that every adverse rating doesn’t produce a disastrous drop in the price of the 
stock” (New York Times 1967). The latter incentive further bolsters the financialized 
commodity audience theory, as there was a clear (and volatile) relationship between 
perceived audience size (i.e., ratings) and stock price.38 Moreover, AB-PT’s comments 
betray the endless cycle whereby a publicly-traded “growth” company like AB-PT 
constantly turns to financial entities for capital, growth, and diversification. 
In summary, one cannot necessarily draw a clear line between Wall Street 
influence and the resulting texts/audiences. Still, the broadcasting industry certainly 
discussed audiences as if they were commodities—commodities that added to (or 
lessened) a particular stock’s value and/or led to the financial legitimation of a particular 
television program, organization, or industry. Indeed, the “financialized commodity 
 
38 Of course, it is worth noting that forces other than ratings could affect ABC’s stock price. For 
example, the speculation that ABC and ITT would merge led to a significant increase in ABC’s stock 




audience” formation that ABC would present to shareholders, Wall Street analysts, and 
the FCC represented a formal transaction: the exchange of a commodity (i.e., an 
imagined audience) for a price (i.e., a stock price). 
Conclusion 
After three decades of floundering, ABC finally gained a foothold and passed 
CBS and NBC in the ratings to become a first-place network in the 1970s (Goldenson 
and Wolf 1991, 366). As Cynthia Meyers (2009) notes, however, ABC did not 
necessarily lead the networks in gross ratings (GRPs); they led in the targeted ratings 
(TRPs) (75). Thereafter, NBC and CBS caught onto this strategy and began targeting 
younger, more urban audiences that advertisers desired and encouraged Nielsen to skew 
its samples younger. This suggests that even in the 1960s and 1970s, the networks valued 
a specific type of audience and did not simply care about “lowest common denominator” 
content. Through the efforts of AB-PT in the 1950s, ABC had successfully aggregated a 
significant share of the youth audience. The network then could convince advertisers that 
this type of audience would “experiment with new brands,” which in turn allowed the 
network to increase advertising rates (75). Although Wall Street at first balked at ABC’s 
programming strategy that disregarded “prestige” content—a decision meant to increase 
revenues rather than stock prices—ABC’s ascent up the ratings ladder resulted in an 
exponential increase in its stock price, which peaked at $102 per share in 1967 during its 
negotiations with ITT (Table 1; Quinlan 1979, 144). 
This period between the flourishing of corporate liberalism—which diminished in 




regulation that provided more checks and balances on ownership. Competition in the 
post-war years was hardly perfect, nor was programming bought and sold on a perfect 
free market. The industry, which was already concentrated to three networks, was 
implicitly beholden to Wall Street interests, and institutional investors maintained 
ownership interests in dozens of stations—all of which was seemingly sanctioned by the 
FCC. It is easy to levy these complaints against the FCC for its lack of intervention and 
general ambivalence, but it would be a missed opportunity to not recognize the rules and 
regulations that are still valuable today that help us understand the normative dimensions 
of corporate governance. For example, the FCC’s 1% ownership caps on institutional 
investors acknowledged the soft power that existed in the television industry, beyond just 
outright corporate ownership of stations and mergers/acquisitions. Additionally, the 
FCC’s initial mandate that limited institutional investors to non-voting stock at least 
theoretically addressed the allocative power of financial interests. Although inconsistent, 
the FCC was also relatively skeptical of mergers during this period. For example, the 
failure of the ABC-ITT merger and the FCC’s rejection of AB-PT’s financial motivations 
in that hearing demonstrate the agency’s ability to address financialization and market 
concentration. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Financial Interest and 
Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn Rules) instituted in 1970 represented the final swan song of 
government ownership regulation before the onslaught of neoliberalism and corporate-
friendly re-regulation in the 1970s and 1980s. With the Fin-Syn Rules, ABC separated its 
production arm from ABC proper in 1972, which then provided more opportunities for 




1991, 452–453).39 Overall, these examples of productive intervention and meaningful 
oversight suggest that the government’s involvement in broadcasting in the mid-century 
was inconsistent, yet remains valuable because it provides the regulatory frameworks 
necessary to address the underlying financial ownership structures in cultural production. 
After this period, however, hyper-financialization in the media industries and 
across the economy would take hold. This, coupled with new means of distribution like 
cable and satellite and the fragmentation of the mass audience, further intensified the 
financialized commodity audience, as executives tried to prove to investors and analysts, 
in addition to advertisers, that their audience was the most valuable. With the rise of 
conglomeration, cable television, and ownership deregulation, the financialized 
commodity audience would continue to evolve and be based on a new set of criteria and 







39 Once it became clear to ABC that the Reagan administration was going to deregulate the media 
industries, Goldenson claimed that “ABC took the charge” in trying to dismantle Fin-Syn (Goldenson 




CHAPTER THREE: RACE, FINANCIALIZATION, & PERFORMATIVE 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN STREAMING TELEVISION 
 Today, I was thinking about my great grandfather. He was born a slave in South 
Carolina. Was a slave for ten years of his life. And when the northerners came down, 
they started educating some of the newly freed black children, and he learned how to 
read. Got enamored with education and dedicated his life to three things: education, 
freedom of black people, [and] Jesus Christ. Became a juggernaut in the AME Church. It 
was a pretty amazing story my great grandfather had, and I thought about him all day 
today because I wish I could see him now. And I wish he could see me because I wonder 
what he would say. This week I flew to New York on a private jet to host Saturday Night 
Live. Netflix started streaming a show that bears his name, The Chappelle Show. And 
HBO Max is streaming it… 
And I didn’t get paid for any of it.  
[Laughter] 
Yeah, if he could see me now he’d probably be like, “this [expletive] got bought and sold 
more than I have.” 
Dave Chappelle, Saturday Night Live (NBC), Season 42, Episode 6 
 
Introduction 
The epigraph opening this chapter—Dave Chapelle’s monologue from a 2020 
episode of Saturday Night Live—pointedly addresses some of the underlying problems of 
media ownership in the streaming era and questions where true financial control rests in 
contemporary media industries. In a subsequent Instagram video titled “Unforgiven,” 
Chappelle would go on to explain that he had signed a contract with his agent, the cable 
channel Comedy Central, and the channel’s parent company Viacom (now ViacomCBS) 
that gave Viacom the rights to the series’ syndication revenue and Chappelle’s “likeness” 
in perpetuity. However, Chappelle claims he had little legal knowledge of what this 
initial agreement meant at the time of signing (Chappelle 2020). Twenty years later, 




Netflix and HBOMax, even though the contract he had signed already (meagerly) 
compensated him for the show’s early 2000s run on Comedy Central. Chappelle even 
called upon his fans to boycott the show. 
After airing his grievances on Saturday Night Live and beseeching fans to not 
watch his show on streaming platforms, both HBOMax or Netflix pulled the syndicated 
program, and Viacom allowed Chappelle to renegotiate his contract. Effectively, 
Chappelle used his platform to create a small structural change, and viewers 
demonstrated their agency by boycotting the show. In another video uploaded to 
Instagram weeks later, Chappelle directly addressed white audience members. He 
thanked them for not watching Chappelle, saying “I know where my power lies. I asked 
you to stop watching the show and thank God Almighty for you, you did. You made that 
show worthless…  Because without your eyes, it’s nothing [my italics]” (Chappelle 
2021). This final comment about Chapelle’s assumed audiences provides some reason to 
be ambivalent, as he still needed to rely on white audiences with purchasing power for 
this outcome. Additionally, Netflix’s decision to renegotiate his deal may not have had 
anything to do with social justice or even diminished viewership, as it had an ongoing 
partnership with Chappelle for a series of comedy specials, so this removal may have 
been a financial decision, not an ethical one.  
Although this case is situated outside of ABC and the Disney conglomerate, this 
situation foregrounds the continued importance of a specific type of assumed audience 
(white, wealthy viewers) in the streaming era and how social justice initiatives, however 




Chappelle’s predicament also raises several critical questions for media scholars, 
including who actually “owns” the intellectual property hidden beneath film and 
television content? Who profits from the many licensing agreements and downstream 
revenue opportunities in today’s media landscape? What types of audiences do financial 
stakeholders wish to target, not just for “first runs” but also in syndication? How does this 
affect programming and branding decisions, particularly when it comes to earnest 
representations of race and ethnicity? 
In this chapter, I address some of these questions. Specifically, I detail how Wall 
Street and finance capitalism have exacerbated “plastic representation” (Warner 2017) 
and inhibited the quality of diversity in media industries by engaging in performative 
social justice and keeping racial diversity surface-level—all in order to placate white 
viewers and investors. As the industry continues to become concentrated and 
conglomerates take their intellectual property in-house (onto their owned-and-operated 
streaming platforms), audiences have continued to be vitally important for the television 
industry. Indeed, Disney’s 2019–2021 earnings calls with investors demonstrate how 
internal and external stakeholders discuss and theorize ABC and Hulu’s audience in 
relation to Disney’s other holdings. Leveraging trade sources like Deadline and Variety, 
an interface analysis of Hulu, and earnings call transcripts, I argue that meetings with 
investors and Disney’s other business maneuvers reflect how the financial sector 
implicitly prefers a very specific type of audience (i.e., those who are young, white, and 
rich), despite its (slight) increase in on-screen minority representation. Before 




conglomeration, the evolution of the quality commodity audience, and the branding of 
race. 
Literature Review 
Neoliberalism, Conglomeration, and Hyper-Financialization, 1970–Today 
Neoliberalism is a fairly ubiquitous concept that is used in various industrial and 
academic contexts, often meaning different things to different people. Within the context 
of this analysis, I take neoliberalism to mean the corporate-friendly regulation and policy 
that began in the late 1970s. David Harvey (2007), for one, traces the roots of neoliberal 
ideologies to the economic downturn in the 1970s, when politicians and citizens alike 
blamed labor unions and excessive government regulation (not the financial sector) for 
the economic strife.40 David Hesmondhalgh (2013) adds that this recession, which he 
terms the “Long Downturn,” led to a backlash of government-friendly regulation that 
opposed government intervention and New Deal welfare policies. Under Ronald Regan in 
the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, labor unions weakened, 
credit was restricted due to higher interest rates, and antitrust regulation was dismantled, 
all leading to an increase in global mergers and acquisitions (99). Beyond just a 
macroeconomic political ideology, Jennifer Holt (2011) points out that, on the individual 
psychological level, neoliberalism conflates “principles of individual freedom” with “the 
 
40 Although a term that has more recently entered the academic lexicon over the past forty years, 
neoliberalism is not a new ideology. In the 1920s, political and industrial discourse around financial 
regulation relied on what was known as “percolator theory”—the idea that economic stimulus for 
society and the state comes from the top-down, from private businesses (Geisst 2018, 174–175). If 
that concept sounds familiar, that is because percolator theory was grounded in the same ideology as 
Ronald Reagan’s “trickle down” economics. In other words, neoliberalism (and financialization for 




practicalities of market freedom” (10). 
Critically, Hesmondhalgh characterizes the neoliberal government action from the 
1970s through the 1990s as “re-regulation,” not deregulation, because there were many 
state actions that enabled large corporations to flourish. In other words, the markets were 
hardly “free” or devoid of government intervention; the success of particular firms 
(typically large conglomerates) was the result of government assistance. In the 1980s, the 
FCC under Reagan-appointed commissioner Mark Fowler dismantled government 
controls on media ownership and industry monopolies (136).41 The removal of the 
Financial Interest & Syndication Rules in the early 1990s and the rollback of other 
ownership limitations typified the corporate liberalism of the period. Holt (2011) details 
in Empires of Entertainment how this deregulation led to a “structural convergence” of 
the film, cable, and broadcasting industries. By the 1990s, with the help of the 
Telecommunications Act signed by Democratic President Bill Clinton in 1996, the 
federal government sanctioned vertical integration and cross-industry mergers in the 
television, film, and telecom industries, often at the expense of smaller independent 
competitors. 
Along with the rise of neoliberal re-regulation, the use of corporate “synergies” 
increased in the cultural industries. Synergy refers to the strategies whereby 
conglomerates leverage their diverse business segments across various sub-industries in a 
way that maximizes efficiencies and minimizes costs. Some of these strategies include 
 
41 Though, Hesmondhalgh (2013) points out that many studies of media ownership, particularly in the 
“Schiller-McChesney tradition” of political economy, overstate how concentrated media industries 




cross-promotion, cost reduction, productivity efficiencies, and a reduction in transaction 
costs—which all go toward keeping prices high for consumers and wages low for low-
level employees (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 197). On a textual level, this may mean that a film 
or a television episode may explicitly promote a different segment of a distributor and/or 
producer’s portfolio. For example, a 2012 episode of Modern Family (ABC, 2009–2020) 
and a 2016 episode of black-ish (ABC, 2014– ) both feature the protagonists visiting 
Disney World, which blatantly promoted another Disney property on an ABC program. 
In this chapter, I expand the traditional definition of synergy by defining it more broadly 
as the strategies that go toward keeping customers within the Disney universe. Disney 
certainly does not want viewers seeking content from other platforms like Netflix or 
Amazon or other theme parks like Universal Studios; it wants to gesture customers 
toward the Disney-owned Disney+, Hulu, and Disneyland, among other properties. Put 
another way, it is just not about the promotion of Disney’s other assets; it is about 
conveying to customers that Disney’s assets altogether fulfill all of the public’s 
entertainment wants and needs. 
In lockstep with neoliberalism in the 1980s was the hyper-financialization of the 
economy. However, some scholars dispute whether we should still be discussing the 
influence of the financial sector at all. Douglas Gomery, for example, contends that 
“‘financial control’ is no longer an appropriate framework” to understand U.S. media 
industries (168). Gomery, who focuses vaguely on corporate control and intra-industry 
collusion, overlooks the complex financial systems that undergird media systems and the 




that accelerated media conglomeration in the second half of the 20th century. 
Specifically, deWaard cites the final death knell for antitrust regulation as the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which then allowed commercial banks and bank holding 
companies to own investment banks, thereby expanding the reach of major financial 
institutions (57). Indeed, institutional investors went from controlling 7% of the stock 
market in 1950 to approximately 70–90% of the stock market in 2020, with the three of 
the largest institutional investors—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—maintaining 
a partial ownership stake in 88% of the 500 largest publicly traded companies (58). 
Therefore, contrary to Gomery’s contentions, deWaard ties conglomeration to the 
increased power of financial entities, all of which prefer concentrated industries and 
limited competition; this ensures prices stay high, costs remain low, and dividends and 
stock prices continue to skyrocket.  
ABC was certainly not immune to the vicissitudes of conglomeration and 
financialization that defined the film and television industries in the second half of the 
20th century. Thomas Schatz (2008) details Hollywood’s transition, between the 1970s 
and the 1990s, from mogul-run film studios to entities that were just one segment 
underneath massive, diversified conglomerates like Sony or Disney. Eileen Meehan 
(2011) notes how a similar situation occurred in the television industry, where 
broadcasting companies became horizontally and vertically integrated between 1980 to 
2008, merging with other media segments like film studios and cable television 
companies. In the case of ABC, Janet Wasko (2020) notes how the network bounced 




detailed in chapter two, ABC was under the control of the somewhat diversified 
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres from 1953 to 1985. In 1985, Capital Cities 
Communications purchased ABC; as Capital Cities was only one quarter the size of ABC 
at the time, the new parent company borrowed over $500 million from a collection of 
banks to finance the deal (Goldenson & Wolf 1991, 465). Then, in 1996, the increasingly 
powerful entertainment conglomerate The Walt Disney Company completed its 
acquisition of Capital Cities/ABC and its assets, which at that time included ESPN and a 
handful of other cable networks (Wasko 2020, 37). Thereafter, ABC became just one 
small segment of Disney that helped demonstrate Disney’s “synergies” and 
diversification to investors; as detailed in chapter two, this positioning of ABC was 
consistent with the financial sector’s desire for risk minimization through diversification. 
The New Old Commodity Audience 
Amid structural convergence and financialization, cable and premium channels 
made it seem as though they targeted more niche audiences and, in effect, had dismantled 
the commodity audience through content democratization. However, this belies the 
continuities between new and “old” commodity audiences. Eileen Meehan (1986) notes 
how the commodity audience first shifted further away from “the masses” in 1970 when 
Nielsen skewed its sample in a way that was “more urban and more youthful, less rural 
and less geriatric” (406).42 Thereafter, the standards by which networks did or did not 
cancel programming shifted even further, beyond Nielsen ratings. As early as the late 
 
42 Although ABC’s branding strategy had specifically targeted children and young housewives as 
early as the mid-1950s, Nielsen did not codify and implement this shift until the 1970s when NBC 




1970s, the networks sought to attract “quality” audiences who were not only “younger” 
and “more urban” (per Nielsen’s measurement) but also “more socially liberal” (Newman 
and Levine 2012, 22). For example, Cagney & Lacey (CBS, 1982–1988) received low 
ratings throughout its run on CBS, but it was able to remain on the air because it 
maintained a “quality audience [of] upscale working women,” whom advertisers desired 
(D’Acci 1994, 66). 
Today, premium channels like HBO and direct-to-consumer streaming platforms 
like Disney+ certainly bypass advertisers, which seemingly puts an end to the commodity 
audience in these spheres. However, Jane Feuer (2007) has pointed out how premium 
channels have targeted the same economically affluent viewers that advertisers had long 
targeted. To attract these types of viewers, cable channels like HBO position their content 
as an improvement on what came before, relying on discourses that tout “quality” 
programming and taglines like “It’s Not TV. It’s HBO.” Cory Barker (2007) similarly 
details how streaming platforms like Amazon Prime Video have continued promotional 
discourses of “Quality TV” in an effort to legitimate new digital distribution methods. In 
addition to marketing discourses, I detail in this chapter how cultural intermediaries, 
including Disney executives, package and sell “quality commodity audiences” to 
investors. The financialization of media industries has led corporate executives, Wall 
Street analysts, and institutional investors to package and homogenize particular 
“quality” audiences to justify expensive content acquisitions and/or to manufacture brand 
equity in an era of increasingly siloed distribution. 




construction that implicitly addresses race, ethnicity, and gender. Meehan (2002) also 
notes that advertisers and networks do not need to explicitly discuss race or gender in 
their formulation of the commodity audience for it to be racist or sexist (217). Instead, 
racism is inherent within the biases of a hegemonic capitalist system. Additionally, just 
because a channel or series features minority characters, this does not mean that those 
programs are meant for the individuals from that community. For example, Beretta E. 
Smith-Shomade (2004) uses Black Entertainment Television (BET) to demonstrate how 
blackness has been commodified and is often reduced to its marketability. In 2000, when 
Viacom purchased BET for $3 billion, the conglomerate altered the channel’s 
programming to appeal to a broader base of viewers beyond just African Americans, 
ultimately essentializing blackness to a monolithic identity construction that white 
viewers would have been familiar and comfortable with. She critically identifies the 
business logic behind BET’s commodity audiences: “delivering blacks, as American 
commodities” to white audiences (Smith-Shomade 2004, 77). 
Race, Representation, & Branding in the Post-Network Era 
The target audiences of cable channels and streaming platforms suggest that there 
are more continuities between legacy media and new media than the industry lets on. 
Indeed, Herman Gray’s summary of the television industry in 1993 remains salient today: 
“while [the television industry is] no longer exclusively segregated by race, [it] 
nevertheless remains mediated by racial hierarchies and commercial imperatives” (191).  
Seemingly, with the emergence of cable, the television industry finally recognized niche 




everyone.” However, several scholars have identified how minorities and those from 
marginalized communities have largely been ignored by cable. Making matters worse, 
cable producers and marketers have often relied on minority representations to target the 
same conventional commodity audience that has been in place since 1970: young, urban, 
and socially liberal white viewers. 
In the 1990s, for example, gay-themed programming targeted “socially liberal, 
urban-minded professionals” who believed that these types of shows aligned with their 
progressive viewpoints (Becker 2006). Interviewing two television executives, Julia 
Himberg (2014) details how cable channels like Showtime and Bravo used “lesbian 
programming to tap into multiple markets” (289). Critically, Himberg distinguishes 
between narrowcasting—targeting one niche demographic or psychographic—and 
multicasting—targeting several distinct demographics, particularly those who remain 
attractive to advertisers and have the disposable income necessary to buy advertised 
products. Additionally, in terms of Black-themed programming, The Chappelle Show was 
paradigmatic of Comedy Central’s branding strategy in the early 2000s: translating “hip 
urbanity” to white men 18–34 years old (Fuller 2010, 298). Cable networks have 
postured nichification as “something for everyone”—whether straight or gay, Black or 
White, progressive or conservative—but cable executives, advertisers, and investors still 
value a specific type of consumer. I argue that these so-called “quality” viewers are 
white, and what they are comfortable with has increasingly determined programming 
decisions in the post-network era.  




television financing and distribution should theoretically allow creatives to earnestly 
represent their lived experiences in ways that do not need to cater to the normative white 
middle. In other words, perhaps the long tail of Internet distribution has allowed for more 
on-screen representations of minorities and more opportunities for minorities to write, 
direct, and produce film and television. Many scholars from media studies and critical 
race studies point out, however, that these representations are surface-level and ultimately 
fail to present complex minority characters and the many intersectional identities possible 
within and across communities. 
In this regard, some scholarship has focused on representation. Criticizing the 
oversimplified mantra “representation matters,” Kristin J. Warner (2017) details how 
television producers have simply substituted all-white casts with a few minority actors to 
alleviate accusations of inequality. This focus on the quantity, not quality, of minority 
representation provides “an easy workaround for the executive suites whereby hiring 
racially diverse actors becomes an easy substitute for developing new complex 
characters” (33). Warner declares that this type of artificial “colorblind casting” 
constitutes “plastic representation.” The industry’s tendency toward plastic representation 
can be contextualized within the broader industrial and technological shifts toward 
nichification. Jennifer Fuller (2010) details how, with the emergence of the “niche” 
television environment in the 1990s and early 2000s, cable channels greenlit series with 
more black casts in order to appeal to both new minority audiences and the upscale white 
audiences that advertisers desired. Fuller concludes that this was merely an effort to 




casting. This chapter contributes to Fuller and Warner’s theories by considering not only 
the faux progress of on-screen representation but also the performative social justice that 
distributors leverage to create the appearance of a progressive brand (without disrupting 
financial stability). 
Hoping to take the conversation beyond just on-screen representation, Alfred 
Martin (2020) argues that “studying representation alone is no longer enough (if it ever 
was)... [what I call for is] an examination of the systems that produce images and not 
‘just’ bringing theoretical toolboxes and one’s personal affect to bear on a media text” 
(135). Martin adds, “when race and production practices are studied, the findings are 
considered to be extrapolatable only to those studying race in media production and not 
to those who study unnamed whiteness within media industries” (136). In this case study, 
I aim to open up the conversation within financialization literature on race and media, 
beyond just explicit discussions of Blackness. In financial circles, whiteness is certainly 
an unnamed and unspoken force, so the field would be well served to inject critical race 
studies into political economic analyses where race is not overtly named. 
Case Study: Disney+, Hulu, & ABC 
These seemingly disparate industry trends—conglomeration, the evolution of the 
quality commodity audience, and racialized branding—have affected three aspects of 
Disney’s digital content strategies in the 21st century: content siloing, targeting a younger 
(whiter) audience, and performative social justice. Altogether, this case study on Hulu 
and Disney+ highlights how financialization has undergirded the structural, cultural, and 




race and issues like financialization, industry concentration, and conglomeration. 
Evolution of Hulu: From Legacy Strategies to Content Silos 
Hulu’s gradual strategic pivots from 2009 to 2020 embody the changing media 
economy from linear distribution (based on niche brands and cross-licensing) to 
streaming-focused distribution (based on content silos and internal synergies). Initially, 
Disney's foray into streaming was only through its own branded websites, including 
ABC.com; this was the only place where viewers could watch ABC content online. 
Elsewhere, Disney licensed its television content to various downstream distributors (e.g., 
international television, cable television, DVDs, iTunes, etc.). 
In 2009, however, Disney gestured toward a more “internal” distribution method 
that kept some downstream viewing within a Disney-owned distributor. In May 2009, 
Disney purchased an equity stake in Hulu, sharing the nascent streaming service with 
GE’s NBCUniversal, News Corp.’s Fox, and the private equity fund Providence Equity 
Partners.43 As part of this investment, Disney allowed some of ABC’s content to air on 
Hulu the day after its linear airing on ABC proper (Schechner and Holmes 2009). In 
2016, Time Warner joined the collusively-owned streamer with its 10% stake in Hulu; 
this provided Hulu with more original programming from Time Warner’s many cable 
channels (Ramachandran and Beilfuss 2016). Altogether, this initial ownership 
arrangement evidenced the industry’s tendency toward concentration and decreased 
competition—an arrangement that not only benefited legacy players but also institutional 
 
43 This ownership structure is representative of corporate venture capital and the legacy’s industry’s 




investors, who traditionally benefit from the increased prices and low labor costs 
provided by common ownership (deWaard 2020, 58). 
Between 2009 and 2014, most of Hulu’s content, including ABC and Disney 
series, was available for free—all viewers needed to do was watch one or two ads before 
the start of each program. One could pay a premium to watch ad-free, but this was not 
necessary. In 2014, however, Disney backpedaled on this freemium model, subsequently 
requiring users to authenticate their cable subscriptions in order to view new ABC 
episodes on Hulu (Mitovich 2014); those without a cable subscription needed to wait 
eight days. By 2016, Hulu removed its free service altogether (Oremus 2016). This period 
marked a fundamental shift in Hulu’s content strategy. At first, Hulu was just one way for 
legacy broadcasters and cable channels to direct users back to legacy television, keep 
existing legacy viewers up to speed, and compile user data (Perren 2010). However, post-
2016, Hulu shifted to original programming and building out its own content catalog via 
Disney’s IP library—primarily to compete with the looming threat of Netflix. This was 
solidified in 2019 when, after acquiring 21st Century Fox and purchasing Time Warner’s 
interest in Hulu, Disney assumed full corporate control over Hulu (Arbel 2019).44 Shortly 
thereafter, legacy Hulu partners like WarnerMedia45 and NBCUniversal began pulling 
their content off of Hulu to build out their own streaming services: HBOMax and 
Peacock, respectively (Alexander 2019). Disney’s purchase of 21st Century Fox and 
 
44 Although a minority owner, Comcast (the owner of NBC & Universal) became a silent partner in 
2019 and was not involved in Hulu’s strategic plan. Disney has the option to buy out Comcast’s share 
in 2024 (Arbel 2019).  




FX’s library of programming helped bolster Hulu’s library after the initial retreat of 
NBCUniversal and WarnerMedia (Sutton 2020). 
At this point, Hulu’s primary purpose was not just bringing in advertising and 
subscription revenue or pointing users back to legacy cable television, but enabling 
Disney synergies and segmenting IP into broad categories. Indeed, with the launch of 
Disney+ in 2019, Hulu became the conglomerate’s primary destination for “adult” 
content that did not fit neatly within the family-themed Disney+. Media analyst Rich 
Greenfield posits that Disney had siloed its content into three categories: “Family, sports, 
[and] adult-themed” (Rubin 2019). In the streaming environment, these categories are 
correlated with Disney+, ESPN+, and Hulu, respectively. This simple segmentation was a 
far cry from the complex web of Disney brands on pay television that have maintained (at 
least the appearance of) highly specific channel identities: Freeform, ESPN, Disney 
Channel, Disney Junior, FX, National Geographic, A&E, The History Channel, and 
Lifetime. 
All of this highlights a fundamental shift in the political economy of television: 
Disney now focuses on content that keeps viewers within the Disney universe, rather than 
focusing on maximizing external licensing agreements. With declining DVD sales 
(Eriksen 2021) and the potential of diminishing cross-licensing revenue46 (as other 
conglomerates bring their film and television properties back into their owned-and-
 
46 Interestingly, the industry and the trades still refer to the films and television series on streaming 
platforms that come from the same conglomerate’s library as “licensing deals” (Keegan 2021), even 
though the revenues from these deals are merely balance sheet line items. I argue that this is a way to 




operated streaming platforms), the conglomerates’ production companies have lost out on 
potentially valuable long-term income from external distributors. With these legacy 
revenue streams evaporating, Disney has looked for other ways to monetize its content 
beyond just primary and secondary windows. Now, more than ever, corporations like 
Disney manufacture original film and television content in a way that provides 
“synergies” and drives viewers to other media and entertainment holdings within the 
same conglomerate’s portfolio. In other words, although the revenue from millions of 
Disney+ and Hulu subscribers is certainly valuable, Wall Street demands that Disney 
demonstrate a larger potential upside, beyond a few meager dollars per streaming 
customer. With the siloing of content, implicit investor preferences dictate that Disney 
demonstrate some other means to achieve growth. Disney can prove its portfolio has 
potential upside by manufacturing synergies, keeping viewers/customers within the 
Disney universe, and eventually achieving a total domination of the streaming landscape. 
As the streaming wars intensify, Wall Street has funneled more cash into legacy 
media (i.e., Disney) and emergent media (i.e., Netflix), so they can build out “original” 
content libraries and attract as many subscribers as possible. deWaard (2020) describes 
this imperative, “Wall Street is literally banking on a future in which these five 
companies dominate and monopolize their respective industries, producing far more 
income to justify their valuation” (83). In terms of television, deWaard points out that the 
“speculative tidal wave” of funding from Wall Street has created an oversupply of 
television content, as a few conglomerates battle for audience attention amid cord-cutting 




television industry as users “cut the cord,” Wall Street has still financed a lot of television 
in the hopes of reaping total market domination at some point in the future. As one tech 
CEO once put it, “grab all the eyeballs you can get and figure out how to monetize them 
later” (Atal 2009).47 deWaard (2020) details how the goal of this speculative tidal wave is 
not long-term profitability, consumer innovation, or even immediate monetization, but 
financial extraction (e.g., increasing stock prices and short-term dividends).48 
Earnings Calls & Targeting Young, Highly Engaged Users 
With the siloing of content and diminishing external licensing deals, Disney has 
sought creative ways to convey the value of its products to investors, particularly in the 
absence of profits amid skyrocketing expenses for Hulu and Disney+. One way for 
executives to accomplish this has been to create the perception that Disney users are 
valuable beyond just the subscription fees they pay each month. Continuing the long 
tradition of valuing a specific type of audience (i.e., young, male, and white viewers with 
disposable income), Disney still constructs the same old “quality” commodity audience in 
its exchanges with financial markets. In their discussions with Wall Street analysts, 
Disney executives frequently tout just how young Hulu and Disney+’s viewers are. In a 
Q1 2020 earnings call, for example, former Disney CEO Robert Iger discussed the 
importance of youth audiences: 
The other thing I wanted to say is that the brand studies that we've seen or brand 
research that we've seen in the United States suggests that interest in affinity in 
 
47 This strategy has long defined the venture capital-backed tech industry and its forays in Silicon 
Valley, but this ethos has now bled into film and television as these industries have become more 
financialized. 
48 deWaard (2020) observes that since the 1970s, corporations increasingly shifted profits away from 
reinvestment in labor and innovation to financial distribution via stock dividends and buybacks; 




the Disney brand has actually risen nicely thanks to Disney+, particularly among 
young people. I think a lot of that has to do with the relevance of the platform, the 
technology, the manner of presentation. I think it's a loud statement about what's 
going on in the world today in terms of consumer tastes, particularly young 
people, which is why the demographics of Hulu are substantially younger than the 
demographics of some of our peers in the linear networks. (The Walt Disney 
Company 2020, 16)  
In addition to positioning Disney+ and Hulu as an improvement of legacy 
television, Iger’s emphasis on “young people” foregrounds the speculative future value of 
young audiences. In a subsequent Q1 2021 earnings call, Disney’s newly appointed CEO 
Bob Chapek mentioned, “On ABC, we continue to have the number one returning drama 
in the key demo of adults 18 to 49 with Grey's Anatomy, as well as the top new drama of 
the fall, Big Sky … Both Grey's and Big Sky also hold the top broadcast drama spots on 
Hulu” (The Walt Disney Company 2021). Despite the waning of network television’s 
dominance, the synergistic feeding of ABC programming to Hulu highlights the extended 
shelf life of programming within a conglomerate’s bubble of distribution and, once again, 
the siloed nature of streaming Hollywood. Also, although programs from Disney’s linear 
holdings like ABC are neglected in most Wall Street meetings, this comment 
demonstrates that when ABC is discussed, it is contextualized within the streaming 
environment. In another respect, this comment highlights the industry’s reliance on 
legacy industry concepts and metrics to demonstrate value. Still relying on the “demos” 
and the somewhat artificial 18-to-49 age groups measured by Nielsen demonstrates how 
executives still rely on old legacy practices that may not even apply to the new media 
environment. Even in the absence of advertisers, Disney still hoped to draw viewers from 




carefully measured. Scholars like Alisa Perren (2011) have pointed out that cable 
television targeted “the same 18- to 49-year-old demographic long sought by 
broadcasters” (138). This tradition has continued on Hulu. 
In the same breath, Disney also suggests that Hulu and Disney+ attract “engaged” 
viewers. Disney’s use of the term “engaged” carries a double meaning. It refers to those 
users who spend the most time on Disney’s online platforms, while also connoting that 
those customers are financially engaged and are thus willing to spend more money on 
ancillary Disney products and services. Although never explicitly stated, these young and 
highly engaged viewers are the contemporary version of the “quality” audiences—those 
who are the urban, white, and socially liberal consumers that the networks long targeted. 
Cultural intermediaries like Disney discursively convert these engaged audiences into a 
“quality commodity audience” for Wall Street to prove that Disney attracts the type of 
young viewers who will become indoctrinated and then consistently engage with the 
corporation’s synergistic universe. In other words, executives want investors to think that 
their customers, in any particular segment, are the type of young and passionate users 
who will purchase the goods and services in the corporation’s other segments. This trend 
is also highlighted in Disney’s positioning of FX on Hulu within the Disney portfolio. 
The ways in which Disney executives positioned the newly acquired 21st Century 
Fox in relation to its other holdings also foregrounds how Disney tried to discursively 
convince investors that Disney/Hulu was attracting the right type of young audience: 
those who are rich and engaged. These discussions of FX’s value were implicitly 




purchase, critics praised FX for both its edginess (i.e., profanity, sex, and violence) and 
the auteur-status of its series. Michael Newman and Elana Levine (2012) have pointed 
out how the discourses around these “quality” programs have been part of a longstanding 
effort on the part of television producers to legitimate cable and premium television 
above the lowest common denominator, “vast wasteland” content on broadcast television. 
This discursive elevation in earnings calls is a business tactic to make the viewers of 
cable and streaming television series more valuable than those of legacy television. 
Accordingly, in its discussions with investors, Disney conveys that its content strategies 
are consistent with quality TV’s elevated status and emphasizes that it is able to attract 
the same upscale, affluent audiences in the streaming environment. 
In a 2019 earnings call with Disney executives and market analysts from Wells 
Fargo, Credit Suisse, and UBS, Iger spoke about Disney’s acquisition of 21st Century 
Fox and the value of Fox’s underlying intellectual property. Customary to these earnings 
calls, Iger reassured investors that this multi-billion-dollar acquisition of a new asset was 
a smart business decision. As the acquisition significantly leveraged Disney’s financial 
position, increasing its debt-to-equity ratio (The Walt Disney Company 2019), investors 
wanted to see the synergistic value of the acquisition, beyond just isolated cable 
television revenues. In order to do so, Iger stressed FX’s perceived value, evoking the 
term “quality” multiple times, and how the integration of FX onto Hulu could lure key 
demographics back into the synergistic Disney universe. Specifically, Iger claimed that 
the goal of consolidating Hulu and FX was “to expand our reach to include those viewers 




highly-engaged streaming audience” (The Walt Disney Company 2020, 6). In this same 
call, Iger would go on to celebrate how the average Disney+ viewer utilized the service 
multiple times per week—a key audience metric that measures user “passion” (i.e., 
engagement) (21–22). The use of the term “highly engaged” throughout these 
conversations suggests that Disney wanted its viewers to be “pound for pound” more 
financially valuable than the average television subscriber—hence, the frequent use of the 
“average revenue per user” (ARPU) metric in in many of the company’s recent earnings 
calls.  
Disney wanted to convey that more value could be extracted from its users, 
beyond just subscriptions or retransmission fees, and demonstrate its brand equity to 
investors. Adam Arvidsson and Tiziano Bonini (2015) detail how “brand equity” today is 
“based not only on the number of people who care about [a brand], but also on the 
passion it is able to generate in the people who care” (167). In other words, some viewers 
may be casual customers and not loyal to a specific brand, while others are passionate 
about the brand and what it stands for. Therefore, brand equity is correlative to the level 
of engagement from passionate viewers. In his discussion of HBO, Michael Szalay 
(2014) suggests that brand equity is not merely a way to attract new customers but also a 
way to justify high market valuations to investors—valuations that often far exceed the 
real “book values” on corporate balance sheets. Therefore, Disney’s discursively 
acrobatic positioning of its “highly engaged” and “passionate” viewers is an effort to 
prove that they are the type of individuals who will pursue the company’s other products 




purchasing power of each customer is different; thus, some customers are valued higher 
than others, particularly in the eyes of financial stakeholders. For Disney, passionate 
viewers—those who are more likely to engage with multiple segments of Disney—are 
most highly valued. 
From a financial perspective, Iger’s frequent evocation of FX’s “quality” and 
Disney’s “highly-engaged” subscribers altogether go toward driving up and/or stabilizing 
Disney’s stock price. Unlike the 1950s and 1960s when ABC’s ratings affected AB-PT’s 
stock price, the diversified nature of contemporary conglomerates is more complex, and 
the relationship between the success of programming and a stock price is less correlative. 
In the contemporary environment, brand equity and discursive posturing are now critical 
to financial success. One key element of brand equity is aligning the values of a company 
with the values of its target customers, who, in this case, represent quality commodity 
audiences and multi-segment Disney customers. As noted earlier, the “quality” audiences 
that cable channels and streamers target are typically socially liberal, educated, and 
white; however, this audience has been updated in the digital age with a new qualifier: 
engaged. These white, engaged users are comfortable with certain representations of 
minority characters and progressive marketing campaigns, but only to the extent that their 
social hegemony is not challenged. Prestige programs like the “quality” series from FX 
and Hulu cater to these types of viewers and what they are comfortable with—not 
necessarily to minority groups or even mass audiences.  
Brand Equity & Faux Social Justice 




on-screen and in the writer’s room, the reason for this boom is hardly altruistic and can 
be tied to the media industries’ broader commodification efforts and faux-progressive 
branding plays. Between 2010 and 2021, social justice was increasingly incorporated into 
corporate planning and public relations strategies. Whether through their social media, 
traditional marketing, or programming decisions, media corporations created the 
perception that their brands fostered representational diversity, social justice around 
racial and gender equality, and the inclusion of marginalized workers in creative 
positions of power (i.e., showrunners, writers, directors). Despite its eclectic media 
holdings, Disney is no exception: it recognizes that the young adults who subscribe to 
Hulu and Disney+ care what those brands stand for, including their positions on racial 
inequality and social justice. Summarizing this phenomenon, President of the Disney-
subsidiary Freeform Tom Ascheim stated in 2020 that “86% of young adults expect 
brands to be more than just a product. They want brands that support their belief system 
and we’ve built Freeform with that philosophy in mind” (Low and Otterson 2020).49 
Diversity reports from external auditors like the USC Annenberg Inclusion 
Initiative and The Hollywood Diversity Report50 from UCLA identify how minority 
representations gradually increased between 2011 and 2019 on network, cable, and 
digital television series (Hunt and Ramón 2020).51 Additionally, in response to the anti-
racism protests that occurred in the wake of the deaths of George Floyd and other Black 
 
49 Importantly, two-thirds of Freeform’s viewership came from Hulu in 2020 (Low and Otterson 
2020). 
50 I would be remiss to not note that this report received some financial support from The Walt Disney 
Company. 
51 Still, minority representations still remain well behind the actual proportional population of LatinX, 




Americans at the hands of law enforcement in 2020, media companies released 
statements claiming that they would donate to anti-racism causes and make structural 
changes within their organizations to address racial inequality (Hunt and Ramón 2020, 
10). Still, 92% of media CEOs, 84% of senior executives, and 87% of unit heads remain 
white (Hunt and Ramón 2020, 10). Therefore, it is not a leap in logic to make the 
connection between these all-white executive teams and their weak attempts at more 
diverse content.52 Indeed, the UCLA report ultimately concludes, “There is little evidence 
that the structures that form the industry’s creative ecosystem (e.g., the executive suites, 
production units, marketing units, talent agencies, or writers’ rooms) have been reshaped 
in any meaningful way” (82). 
Using its vast library of Disney content and some external licensing deals, Hulu 
attempts to create a progressive brand that acknowledges social justice and equality, even 
though its executives remain primarily white men, and there has been little structural 
change in the organization. For example in February 2021, Hulu featured a “hub” on its 
main site titled “Black Stories” (Figure 1). Under this hub, Hulu provided a “not-just-for-
February collection of inspiring Black artists, talent, voices, and visionaries” (Hulu, n.d.). 
This hub included black-led series from multiple Disney properties: grown-ish 
(Freeform), Hip Hop Uncovered (FX), and black-ish (ABC) (Figure 2). Under the 
“Features” section in this hub, other content from the Disney umbrella included Little 
Fires Everywhere (Hulu), Snowfall (FX), and City So Real (National Geographic), all of 
 
52 Ironically, companies with more diverse executive teams and board of directors, on average, have 





which were notably led by white showrunners. Despite this promotional effort, I argue 
that Hulu’s programming and interface during this period were part of a broader Disney 
strategy to create the perception of a progressive brand that fostered “inclusion”—
something that was frequently noted to investors.53 
 
Figure 1: Hulu Homepage (Screenshot, www.hulu.com, accessed February 28, 2021). 
 
53 In its Q1 2021 earnings call, Disney claimed that Hulu was a streaming destination “devoted to 
black entertainment and culture” and “continuing [a] commitment and investment in diversity and 





Figure 2: Hulu’s “Black Stories” Hub (Screenshot, www.hulu.com/hub/black_stories-
nav, accessed February 28, 2021). 
Despite Disney, ABC, and Hulu’s seemingly progressive programming strategies 
that promoted stories from Black creatives, Hulu’s target commodity audience was still 
conceived as primarily white, educated, and high income, according to its executives. For 
example, Hulu executives have posited that their “Originals” are targeting an upscale, 
intellectual brand within the context of the Disney portfolio. Hulu’s Head of Originals 
Craig Erwich laid bare the platform’s desire to legitimate itself and attract the quality 
commodity audience when he stated, “one of the ways I really know we’ve hit it is when 
I see our shows being written about not in the entertainment section but in the style or 
politics sections or in The New Yorker. … These shows all go toward building up Hulu as 
a brand that people have to have in their lives” (Adalian 2019). The evocation of The 
New Yorker and the dismissal of lowbrow “entertainment” betrays Hulu’s target 




from “the masses” who crave non-intellectual entertainment. The high-income, educated 
demographics for The New Yorker (Pew Research Center 2012) are indeed similar to the 
audiences that the broadcast networks have targeted since the 1970s. Although Hulu may 
tout original programming like Ramy (2019–),54 which features a second-generation 
Egyptian Muslim American creator, and Love, Victor (2020–), which features the 
coming-of-age story of a gay teenager, these representations still fit neatly within Hulu’s 
progressive brand image and the cultural conversations that quality commodity audiences 
are comfortable with. At the same time, these programs do not challenge the quality 
commodity audience’s power.55 Certainly, Hulu and Disney+ welcome users who are 
minorities and will gladly take their subscription dollars, but they still skew their 
programming and marketing toward the hegemonic middle and rely on white 
showrunners to oversee series about non-White characters. 
Additionally, Hulu’s revenue model still relies on advertising, so Meehan’s initial 
commodity audience formulation is still salient.56 According to Disney CFO Christine 
McCarthy in 2020, the average revenue per user for ad-supported Hulu subscriptions was 
still “very strong” at over $13 per user per month—more than the revenue per user from 
ad-free subscriptions, which reflects just how important advertising continues to be for 
 
54 Ramy’s first season showrunner was also white and, notably, non-Muslim.  
55 Herman Gray (1995) details how, even during the network-era, networks were willing to represent 
black characters only if those characters were “safe” for white audiences (77–79). Gray (2005) later 
identifies how this pattern continued on cable television, “Black shows, where they were developed at 
all, were and are selectively deployed by major commercial networks as part of their overall 
marketing and branding strategy, a strategy and ideal demographic that in all likelihood does not 
include black people as a prime market” (84). 
56 Similarly, Amazon’s IMDB TV is advertiser-supported, reflecting the diversification of streaming 




digital distributors (The Walt Disney Company 2020, 23–24). Therefore, the traditional 
“commodity audience” market still overtly exists in the online space. Not only does this 
reveal the continuing power of advertisers, but it also demonstrates the delicate balance 
that some platforms like Hulu must strike to appease both advertisers who demand “safe” 
content and quality viewers who want “edgy” content. In 2019, Erwich said, “if there are 
advertisers who want to opt-out of more mature content, we can facilitate that. But quite 
frankly, most advertisers want to be associated with a platform that is producing originals 
at that quality that we are, and therefore it’s really not much of an issue” (Adalian 2019). 
In other words, advertisers can push Hulu to produce non-controversial, non-radical 
programs that align with the ideologically “safe” content that has long defined network 
television. 
Another pointed example of the conglomerate’s weak commitment to social 
justice was its handling of an episode of black-ish in 2017. The episode obliquely 
referenced the election of Donald Trump, detailing the anxiety some characters felt, as 
Black Americans, in Trump’s America. As Disney was negotiating with News Corp. 
chairman Rupert Murdoch regarding its potential acquisition of 21st Century Fox in 
2017, Disney was reluctant to allow such an episode to air (Patten 2020). Murdoch was 
closely allied with Trump during the period, and Disney may have feared that a 
politically-charged episode would have pushed Murdoch to pursue a different partner 
(e.g., Comcast). Alternatively, the episode could have even led to criticism from the 
President himself, who would have put further pressure on the Department of Justice to 




on the line, ABC buried the black-ish episode and never aired it, even though it had 
already completed production. As Disney’s financial reports rarely address ABC beyond 
the costs and advertising revenue of its affiliate stations or the occasional mention of a 
syndication deal, a controversial program on ABC would have provided little benefit for 
Disney. In the wake of anti-racism protests in 2020, however, Disney jumped on the 
cultural zeitgeist and released the black-ish episode on the more adult-oriented Hulu, 
once again betraying the value of performative social justice in a content-siloed media 
environment (Patten 2020). Overall, Hulu’s continued reliance on advertising, upscale 
white target audiences, and purely performative platform branding betray the non-radical 
nature of Disney’s content and its desire to not ruffle risk-averse advertisers and 
investors. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the corporate strategies of Disney and Hulu in the 21st-century point 
toward the continued financialization of television in the streaming era. Instead of 
concrete Nielsen ratings pushing stock prices up or down, the discursive positioning of 
audiences has become more important in the conglomerate era. Financial markets have 
driven the concentration of media distribution and led to an oversupply of content from a 
select number of conglomerates. This has coincided with diminishing ancillary 
downstream revenues, which has required corporate executives like Bob Iger to elevate 
the status of particular passionate audiences who are more valuable than others. To attract 
these audiences, who are typically younger, more engaged, and more socially 




commodified race to create progressive brand images. As passionate viewers are more 
likely to speak out against problematic corporate actions, media conglomerates are more 
sensitive to social issues in their marketing strategies. However, these progressive 
discourses and programming decisions ultimately remain surface-level, as to not disrupt 
financialized transactions or scare away investors and advertisers. 
In today’s world of publicly-traded and highly financialized media industries, 
social justice remains superficial, and programming strategies can never quite challenge 
the discursive normativity of whiteness. Indeed, there cannot be genuine social justice in 
media industries until the owners of media content and the corporations behind television 
are representative of all races, genders, and ethnicities, not just the commodity quality 
audience and the investor class. When ownership models and the underlying structure of 
media—not just on-screen representation—become more equitable and diverse, then 
there is the possibility that radical content is possible. Still, Anamik Saha (2020) has 
pointed out that initiatives like mentorships and diversity training in the media industries 
are not nearly enough to address inequality. Instead, media industries require a 
fundamental change in their political economy and a shift in where money is funneled. 
These structural changes need to redefine what “quality” means (highlighting the notion 
that what is deemed “quality TV” is currently defined primarily by white audiences), 
create more equitable hiring practices at the highest level, ensure that progressive content 
actually challenges white hegemony, and bring to light all the unsaid assumptions and 





CONCLUSION: THEORY INTO PRAXIS 
As the case studies in this thesis suggest, the effects of financialization are far-
reaching and stretch across several periods of U.S. media history. Chapter one details 
how the tentacles of Wall Street stretch back to pre-radio communication systems, such 
as the telegraph and telephone. This stranglehold on communication industries continued 
with the introduction of radio in the early 20th century and the financialized formation of 
RCA. As financial markets became more complex and the television industry matured in 
the post-war period, Wall Street was able to not only exert influence over television but 
also further engender industrial concentration via diversification—despite New Deal 
reforms that targeted antitrust violations. As detailed in chapter two, there was a 
noticeable correlation between ABC’s stock prices and ABC’s Nielsen ratings in the 
1950s and 1960s, which suggests that television’s commodity audience may have been 
financialized as early as the mid-century. The financialization of television and its 
audiences would intensify amid neoliberal re-regulation in the late-20th century. Even 
though technological innovation—first with cable and then internet distribution—brought 
more content and minority representation to television, the industry still valued a very 
specific audience: socially liberal, urban-minded, and financially-stable white men and 
women. As chapter three outlines, it was financialization and conglomeration that 
intensified media executives’ desire to prove the value of their commodity audiences to 
Wall Street stakeholders. This desire to attract socially progressive viewers and placate 
Wall Street required a delicate balancing act between creating “safe” non-radical content 




These processes led online platforms like Hulu to engage in performative social justice. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, Janet Wasko (2005) details how one of the four 
key components of political economy is praxis, which I see as a call to action for media 
scholars to identify real-world issues and present at least the broad frameworks that 
gesture toward solutions to such issues (27). Therefore, in addition to the policy lessons I 
address at the end of chapter two, I will spend the remainder of this thesis considering a 
few policy and industrial interventions that, while hardly comprehensive, provide a 
launching point for discussion. Specifically, to address the financial and economic 
problems that stem from financialization, I argue that we must first acknowledge 
financialization’s racial component—in terms of its effects on representation, ideology, 
and economic equality. Accordingly, I organize the following interventions around the 
broader topics of racial economic inequality, on-screen and behind-the-scenes 
representation, and hegemonic ideology. 
First, I start with the most structural issue: economic equality. Indeed, the findings 
throughout this thesis suggest that matters of economics and representation are certainly 
intertwined, but they are distinct issues that each require unique solutions. In other words, 
racism and capitalism are not the same ideologies, nor should they be understood as such; 
however, this does not mean that economic policies and financial transactions are “color 
blind.” Contrary to the neoliberal individualistic mindset, economics can become 
racialized due to the inherent income disparities that exist between white Americans and 
Black Americans. Two-thirds of Black Americans, for example, are “liquid asset poor” 




assets combined) of $300, while a single White man has a median wealth of $28,900 
(64). Worse yet, single Black mothers maintain a median wealth of $0, excluding debt 
(64). In The Hidden Rules of Race, a group of political economists and political scientists 
(Darity Jr. et al. 2017) detail how neoclassical economics has largely ignored “unique 
group formation, group identification, and group action” and how the comparative 
position of Black Americans has worsened over the past fifty years (51). These authors 
reject the notion that economic policies addressing class have nothing to do with race. 
They detail how historical events, from slavery to Jim Crow, and even purportedly 
progressive policies—like the New Deal—have allowed structural inequality to persist.  
Because financialization has intensified the wealth gap, benefitting the investor 
class and further marginalizing asset-poor citizens, it has also exacerbated racial 
inequality. Therefore, when I discuss the quality commodity audience in terms of its 
purchasing power, it is implicitly racialized. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
conclusion to provide the specific antitrust interventions or financial/monetary policies 
that address inequality, I bring up these issues because structural economic inequality 
needs to be addressed in order to more holistically resolve the racist underpinnings of 
financialization (broadly) and the quality commodity audience (specifically). Addressing 
economic inequality could lead to a reformation of the quality commodity audience to 
include Black and minority Americans. Although this solution certainly works within the 
logics of capitalism, rather than upending it, I argue political economists must think 
through these types of pragmatic, incremental interventions. Regarding media 




investing in more than one entity per industry and capping the maximum allowable 
ownership percentage that one institutional investor maintains in a particular company (as 
the FCC once had done with broadcasters in the 1950s and 1960s). Furthermore, 
investment banks and commercial banks must be separated from one another to dismantle 
their financial hegemony. In doing so, the SEC and FCC could foster more competition 
and a more heterogeneous media environment. 
 Second, in addition to macroeconomic policies that address economic inequality 
and antitrust violations, media industries need to address issues of representation—on-
screen, in the writer’s room, and in executive board rooms. Although Alfred Martin 
(2020) has encouraged us to go beyond just on-screen representation in our examinations 
of race and media, representational interventions are still critical issues that need to be 
addressed alongside structural reform. Indeed, the quality of on-screen representations 
matters, as do the number of individuals in high-level creative positions. All of these 
efforts go toward developing television programs that provide more complex minority 
protagonists and narratives that address the lived experiences of intersectional identities. 
The strategies to achieve such on-screen and “in the room” diversity are not 
simple. These issues can, for example, be partially addressed with more diversity in 
executive and managerial positions within media corporations. However, beyond just this 
managerial representation (i.e., showrunners, mid-level managers, directors, etc.), 
allocative control also needs to be diversified. By this, I mean ownership needs to be 
more diverse, which in turn would make boards more diverse. If media corporations 




shareholders and mandate rigorous reporting standards regarding on-screen/management 
diversity and representation. As mentioned in chapter three, diversity cannot simply be 
achieved through corporate diversity training or mentorships (Saha 2020), so future 
scholarship could address the ways to create more minority ownership and diversity in 
the positions where allocative decisions are made. Future research, for one, could re-
examine profit participation by asking: is there a mechanism that provides minority 
employees and minority creatives with profit participation not just in an individual 
project but in a corporation itself? Although this may risk financializing profit 
participation, it at least makes these individuals “part owners” in the company.57 This 
type of stakeholder-ownership model could also engender a stakeholder-based approach 
to corporate governance. Business studies scholars Miguel A. Rodriguez, Joan E. Ricart, 
and Pablo Sanchez (2002), for example, posit that businesses should create boards that 
include consubstantial, contractual, and contextual stakeholders (140). At a large media 
organization like Disney or ViacomCBS, these stakeholders could include below-the-line 
employees, union representatives, independent production partners (i.e., suppliers), 
customers, and creatives (i.e., directors, showrunners, etc.), among others. All this would 
go toward changing the makeup of executive-level positions and those in charge of 
programming decisions, which would at least, in turn, foster more quality minority 
representations and storytelling. But, how do you go about pressuring corporations to 
even incorporate all these structural changes in the first place?  
 
57 This proposal would be only effective if employees’ shares were not diluted through creative 




 Another form of intervention that would address both economic inequality and 
representation is “shareholder activism.” Seventy-five percent of U.S. adults have at least 
one retirement savings account, whether 401Ks, pension funds, or personal investment 
accounts, which likely means their hard-earned money exists somewhere in the public 
market (Adamczyk 2019). Due to the opacity of most 401K accounts, however, 
individuals often do not know where investment firms are moving their money. This, 
unfortunately, means there is a missed opportunity for citizens to take a more active role 
in deciding where to invest—namely, in more ethical and socially responsible companies. 
Although most institutional investors are considered “passive,” they nonetheless vote on 
behalf of retail investors, as their “proxies,” on important corporate governance decisions. 
Some of these referenda include voting on separating the CEO role from the Chairman 
role, aligning the pay of executives with the company’s performance, and reviewing 
social issues like “board diversity, climate change, environmental stewardship, human 
rights and product safety” (Sommer 2019). When it comes to mergers and acquisitions, 
for example, institutional investors prefer market concentration and often vote in favor of 
such resolutions, even if these measures are not in the best interest of individual investors 
or society. However, not all investment funds are created equal. Institutional investors 
like Vanguard and BlackRock tend to proxy vote in favor of management-supported 
resolutions, rather than shareholder-sponsored propositions, while others like Fidelity and 
State Street are more likely to vote against management measures (Sommer 2019). If 
investment funds are engaged properly, individual investors can pressure them to 




better address social issues, including advocating for more progressive television 
programming and quality race representations or voting against harmful antitrust 
measures. Alternatively, investors can even now even divert their savings away from 
large institutional investors to so-called socially responsible funds. Engine No. 1, for 
example, is a hedge fund that “creates long-term value by harnessing the power of 
capitalism” and is currently (invested in and) in a proxy battle with ExxonMobil to 
reduce their carbon emissions (Engine No. 1, n.d.). While shareholder activism and 
activist investors alone are not enough to provide full structural change, both provide 
citizens a new way to “vote with their dollar.” 
 The final intervention I address is more insidious and more difficult to pin down 
than economic inequality and representation: ideology. Indeed, how does one change 
how others think about race, whiteness, and normativity? As I suggest in the conclusion 
to chapter three, simply diversifying board rooms and on-screen representation is not 
enough without educating industry stakeholders and viewers about racial inequality and 
the invisible aspects of white supremacy. This third component is a longer-term project 
that requires collaboration across industry, academic, and government stakeholders. It 
also requires educating the public, in more creative and engaging ways, about the 
invisibility but ever-presence of whiteness and how our media systems enable hegemonic 
normativity. The very fact that discourses of media democratization and a “post-racial” 
society continue to permeate in industry conversations suggests that media educators 
have a long way to go. Moreover, the persistence of faux-progressive content and 




culpability in not only reifying hegemonic ideologies but also co-opting and neutralizing 
progressive movements via branded wokeness. Altogether, educators need to provide 
individuals with not only the tools to conduct ideological critique but also an 
understanding of the biased, yet clever, business strategies that inhibit a genuinely more 
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